On 25/07/2013 15:44, Tore Anderson wrote:
- What kind of problems are you foreseeing?
address hoarding, leading to reduction in market liquidity, leading to profiteering.
- What kind of control mechanisms exist in today's policy, that are removed by 2013-03, will forestall these problems?
historically, two things: the presence of policies which make it difficult to transfer large amount of address space from many different sources, and secondly, the fact that IP addresses had little market value due to the fact they were effectively being dispensed for $notmuch by the rirs. I.e. lots of effort for little return.
[There is a 24-month reallocation freeze, but I don't think this is going to work because it will not affect the reality of real world allocation transfers. Consequently, people will flout it, and then we will need to remove it from the policy mechanism because it's causing the registry function to break down.]
s/24-month reallocation freeze/requirement to demonstrate need/
Does this argument work equally well? If no, why not?
it's the same argument, which means that we need to understand that it is a bad idea to put any faith in the 24-month reallocation freeze rule as a means of regulating the market, or to believe that the rule will stay there as a long term fixture.
Probably impossible to answer accurately.
that is true, but it might be useful to make some sort of estimate particularly with regard to the class A+B legacy allocations. Eyeballing, I figure there's probably quite a good chunk of unrouted legacy space or legacy space which ended up in commercial organisations who probably don't need all that space, and which could eventually come into the market - maybe 30-40 /8s as a rough estimate. Given that the RIRs ploughed through 94 /8s since the early 1990s, this represents a reasonably large amount of integers from the point of view of potential future liquidity. Nick