Hi Jan, Thanks for your time, looks like other's are too busy or already at the basement / under attack.. Here's what I've found: AS8291 The Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation / Main Division of Informations Resources / kremlin.ru, etc. AS43797 The Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation AS42121 The Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation AS48552 OJSC The Russian Armed Forces Broadcasting Company ZVEZDA AS57767 Federal State-owned Enterprise Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network AS57352 Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency AS57107 Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Russian Satellite Communication Company" AS57767 Federal State-owned Enterprise Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network AS59541 Federal State-owned Enterprise "Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network" AS44479 Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency AS25292 Federal State Unitary Enterprise "The Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Company" AS211382 Federal State Unitary Enterprise of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour "Russian Broad-casting and AS208075 Federal State Unitary Enterprise of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour "Russian Broad-casting and AS201030 Federal state unitary enterprise "Public corporation for organisation of air traffic in Russian Fede AS198372 Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Television Technical Center "Ostankino" AS197969 Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Morsviazsputnik" AS197553 Federal state unitary enterprise 'State Research Institute of Aviation Systems' AS197150 Federal State Unitary Enterprise of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour "Russian Broad-casting and AS196641 Federal Unitary State Enterprise General Radio Freqency Centre AS57724 DDOS-GUARD THAT HIDES RT.COM and others russian's broadcasting companies .... (This list can be much longer, it's from my quick research) Guys, who read, please help us, please make some unexpected failures, anyway you know what to do. *Let's make our work Now!* Thanks for all of you guys, we all want Internet with freedom and without dictatorship! Love and peace for all of you guys! -- Cheers, Den
While i fully support ukraine in these tough times and can easily say i will do what i can against russia, i would like to remind you that there is a difference between talking about lawful sanctions and us implementing them versus outright cyber attack requests which at least i feel is not for this forum. No matter how justified. On Mon, Feb 28, 2022, 16:04 Den <den.rlir@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Jan,
Thanks for your time, looks like other's are too busy or already at the basement / under attack..
Here's what I've found:
AS8291 The Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation / Main Division of Informations Resources / kremlin.ru, etc. AS43797 The Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation AS42121 The Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation AS48552 OJSC The Russian Armed Forces Broadcasting Company ZVEZDA AS57767 Federal State-owned Enterprise Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network AS57352 Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency AS57107 Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Russian Satellite Communication Company" AS57767 Federal State-owned Enterprise Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network AS59541 Federal State-owned Enterprise "Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network" AS44479 Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency AS25292 Federal State Unitary Enterprise "The Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Company" AS211382 Federal State Unitary Enterprise of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour "Russian Broad-casting and AS208075 Federal State Unitary Enterprise of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour "Russian Broad-casting and AS201030 Federal state unitary enterprise "Public corporation for organisation of air traffic in Russian Fede AS198372 Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Television Technical Center "Ostankino" AS197969 Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Morsviazsputnik" AS197553 Federal state unitary enterprise 'State Research Institute of Aviation Systems' AS197150 Federal State Unitary Enterprise of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour "Russian Broad-casting and AS196641 Federal Unitary State Enterprise General Radio Freqency Centre AS57724 DDOS-GUARD THAT HIDES RT.COM and others russian's broadcasting companies
....
(This list can be much longer, it's from my quick research)
Guys, who read, please help us, please make some unexpected failures, anyway you know what to do.
*Let's make our work Now!*
Thanks for all of you guys, we all want Internet with freedom and without dictatorship!
Love and peace for all of you guys!
--
Cheers, Den --
To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or change your subscription options, please visit: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/address-policy-wg
On 1 Mar 2022, at 07:21, Mathias Westerlund <mathias.westerlund@wdmab.se> wrote:
While i fully support ukraine in these tough times and can easily say i will do what i can against russia, i would like to remind you that there is a difference between talking about lawful sanctions and us implementing them versus outright cyber attack requests which at least i feel is not for this forum. No matter how justified.
I agree 100%. The NCC *MUST* remain neutral no matter how much we oppose the attack on Ukraine. It's the start of a very slippery slope if we (for some definition of we) start taking decisions about who does and doesn't get numbering resources. Or freezing/withdrawing those that have already been allocated. [Apart from the usual sanctions when an LIR is in breach of the membership agreement, say by not paying.] Those decisions have to be taken elsewhere: ie the Dutch courts. There's no need for the NCC to intervene here. Those who want to make life difficult for the Russian government can take their own decisions about which prefixes get advertised or dropped by their routers.
I agree with you. However i still feel there is the need to discuss and check what actions RIPE is supposed to take under the sanctions by EU. On Tue, Mar 1, 2022, 08:48 Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com> wrote:
On 1 Mar 2022, at 07:21, Mathias Westerlund <mathias.westerlund@wdmab.se> wrote:
While i fully support ukraine in these tough times and can easily say i will do what i can against russia, i would like to remind you that there is a difference between talking about lawful sanctions and us implementing them versus outright cyber attack requests which at least i feel is not for this forum. No matter how justified.
I agree 100%.
The NCC *MUST* remain neutral no matter how much we oppose the attack on Ukraine.
It's the start of a very slippery slope if we (for some definition of we) start taking decisions about who does and doesn't get numbering resources. Or freezing/withdrawing those that have already been allocated. [Apart from the usual sanctions when an LIR is in breach of the membership agreement, say by not paying.] Those decisions have to be taken elsewhere: ie the Dutch courts.
There's no need for the NCC to intervene here. Those who want to make life difficult for the Russian government can take their own decisions about which prefixes get advertised or dropped by their routers.
On 1 Mar 2022, at 07:50, Mathias Westerlund <mathias.westerlund@wdmab.se> wrote:
However i still feel there is the need to discuss and check what actions RIPE is supposed to take under the sanctions by EU.
I'm not so sure. If the Dutch courts or government require a certain course of action, there's little to discuss or check: do as you're told or the board and CEO go to jail for sanctions busting and/or contempt of court. BTW, it's RIPE NCC, not RIPE, that will be bound by any EU sanctions. The RIPE community has no legal identity or formal membership. RIPE NCC does. The distinction is significant. I'm sure the NCC's management and legal team will look into the EU's sanctions and advise this WG (and NCC Services? and the NCC's GM?) on how to proceed. Let's leave them to get on with that work and avoid a long, pointless debate here by amateur, wannabe lawyers.
Community friends, The urge for action is understandably strong but please, refrain from using this working group as a platform for targeted cyber attacks. Despite where the moral compass may point. Also this is not the most effective forum for discussing potential sanctions or exceptions for specific RIPE NCC members. I would suggest the ripe-list (www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/ripe-list/) or perhaps the RIPE NCC Services WG (https://www.ripe.net/participate/ripe/wg/active-wg/services) are more appropriate for airing such concerns. Address Policy - which is the focus of this working group - is applied consistently to all RIPE NCC members. Regards, James APWG co-chair On Mon, Feb 28, 2022 at 4:03 PM Den <den.rlir@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Jan,
Thanks for your time, looks like other's are too busy or already at the basement / under attack..
Here's what I've found:
AS8291 The Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation / Main Division of Informations Resources / kremlin.ru, etc. AS43797 The Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation AS42121 The Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation AS48552 OJSC The Russian Armed Forces Broadcasting Company ZVEZDA AS57767 Federal State-owned Enterprise Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network AS57352 Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency AS57107 Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Russian Satellite Communication Company" AS57767 Federal State-owned Enterprise Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network AS59541 Federal State-owned Enterprise "Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network" AS44479 Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency AS25292 Federal State Unitary Enterprise "The Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Company" AS211382 Federal State Unitary Enterprise of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour "Russian Broad-casting and AS208075 Federal State Unitary Enterprise of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour "Russian Broad-casting and AS201030 Federal state unitary enterprise "Public corporation for organisation of air traffic in Russian Fede AS198372 Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Television Technical Center "Ostankino" AS197969 Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Morsviazsputnik" AS197553 Federal state unitary enterprise 'State Research Institute of Aviation Systems' AS197150 Federal State Unitary Enterprise of the Order of the Red Banner of Labour "Russian Broad-casting and AS196641 Federal Unitary State Enterprise General Radio Freqency Centre AS57724 DDOS-GUARD THAT HIDES RT.COM and others russian's broadcasting companies
....
(This list can be much longer, it's from my quick research)
Guys, who read, please help us, please make some unexpected failures, anyway you know what to do.
*Let's make our work Now!*
Thanks for all of you guys, we all want Internet with freedom and without dictatorship!
Love and peace for all of you guys!
--
Cheers, Den --
To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or change your subscription options, please visit: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/address-policy-wg
participants (4)
-
Den -
James Kennedy -
Jim Reid -
Mathias Westerlund