- anti-abuse-wg - mailman.ripe.net

AS48666 MAROSNET
by Fi Shing 06 Feb '20

06 Feb '20

Regarding AS48666 MAROSNET Telecommunication Company LLC, Phishing URL: http://barrierfenceco[.]xyz/upd/ IP: 178.159.36.182 Phishing URL: https://abbahaircareproducts[.]xyz/gsodjif/index.php IP: 91.234.99.117 route: 91.234.99.0/24 descr: Client's network descr: Russia, Moscow origin: AS48666 mnt-by: MNT-MAROSNET created: 2020-01-12T18:42:46Z last-modified: 2020-01-12T18:42:46Z source: RIPE route: 178.159.36.0/24 descr: Client's network origin: AS48666 mnt-by: MAROSNET-MNT created: 2016-10-26T15:40:48Z last-modified: 2016-10-26T15:40:48Z source: RIPE This provider has no publicly accessible website and is unreachable. The email address listed on RIPE as info at marosnet2.ru bounces. It is the provider of autonomous ranges, including that including IP 178.159.36.182 and 91.234.99.117 which is being used to host a plethora of phishing websites. https://ipinfo.io/AS48666 reveals AS48666 sub-lets to "Private Internet Hosting LTD" who has sub-let to the phisher themself. --

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The Great AFRINIC Heist -- The Enablers
by Ronald F. Guilmette 30 Jan '20

30 Jan '20

As the primary investigator pursuing this case, I have invested more than a little effort into continuing to track what has been going on as AFRINIC attempts to remediate the effects of these thefts. I would like now to provide you all with some insight into the current situation and status relating to the affected stolen AFRINIC blocks and the multiple parties in your own region who are continuing, at present, to provide routing to the various bits and pieces of the stolen AFRINIC IPv4 space. My hope, of course, is that you will all join with me in trying to persuade these networks to cease all routing to all of the stolen AFRINIC address space. A full list of all of the stolen AFRINIC blocks that are still of ongoing concern at the present moment is available here: https://pastebin.com/raw/71zNNriB Note that many of the blocks listed at the link above have already been "reclaimed" as far as the AFRINIC WHOIS records are concerned. But because routing remains almost entirely decoupled from RIR WHOIS data bases, much of this "reclaimed" space is still being routed as I write this. The only difference is that now the space is being routed as bogons, rather than as "legitimately" allocated space. A summary of all of the current routing for all of the stolen AFRINIC IPv4 address space that is still of concern (including routing for recently reclaimed address space that AFRINIC will eventually be returning to its free pool) is provided below. This list is sorted by the number of constituent stolen /24 blocks being routed by each listed network, thus showing the most major offenders at the top. A few footnotes concerning specific ASNs in this list follow below the listing. I urge everyone on this mailing list to share this data as widely as possible in and among the global networking community. In all cases noted below, the networks in question are unambiguously routing IP blocks that were obtained, in the first instance, via thefts perpetrated by one or more AFRINIC insiders and then resold on the black market in secretive deals. In many and perhaps most cases listed below, the relevant networks appear to have been more than happy to accept some cash in exchange for their services, while not looking all that carefully at the purported (but fradulent) "LOA" documents that they were given in order to persuade them to announce routes to stolen IP space. (Repeated use of blatantly fradulent documents has been one of the consistant features of this entire ongoing criminal enterprise.) I would also like to request the assistance of every person on this mailing list in the task of informing all of the networks that are mentioned in the list below, and that are within your own geographic region, that they are each currently announcing routes to stolen IP space. Of course, it is my hope that you will also encourage them, in no uncertain terms, to stop doing this immediately, if not sooner. As you can see below, this Internet crime spree is a globe-spanning and ongoing disaster. There is no way that I can get all of this mess cleaned up on my own. I am therefore relying on all people of honesty and good will, in all regions, to assist me in getting the word to the networks mentioned below, and telling them, very directly, that they are each facilitating a colossal fraud that affects the whole of the global Internet community. (I know for a fact that there is ongoing criminal activity which is being perpetrated from at least some of this provably stolen IP address space, so it is in the self interest of every honest netizen to get this all turned off and shut down.) All routing data is derived from current data published by RIPEstat. ====================================================================== 3719 0 ?? UNROUTED IP SPACE 629 132165 PK Connect Communication 512 18013 HK Asline Limited 504 19969 US Joe's Datacenter, LLC 500 62355 CO Network Dedicated SAS 423 202425 SC IP Volume inc 286 58895 PK Ebone Network (PVT.) Limited 250 136525 PK Wancom (Pvt) Ltd. 192 18530 US Isomedia, Inc. 186 9009 GB M247 Ltd 134 262287 BR Maxihost LTDA 132 204655 NL Novogara LTD 79 132116 IN Ani Network Pvt Ltd 75 136384 PK Optix Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited 68 132422 HK Hong Kong Business Telecom Limited 60 137443 HK Anchnet Asia Limited 48 63956 AU Colocation Australia Pty Ltd 26 132335 IN LeapSwitch Networks Pvt Ltd 21 131284 AF Etisalat Afghan 20 139043 PK WellNetworks (Private) Limited 19 43092 JP OSOA Corporation., LTD 17 36351 US SoftLayer Technologies Inc. 16 56611 NL REBA Communications BV 16 199267 IL Netstyle A. Ltd 16 23679 ID Media Antar Nusa PT. 14 137085 IN Nixi 10 63018 US Dedicated.com 9 136782 JP Pingtan Hotline Co., Limited 8 45671 AU Servers Australia Pty. Ltd 8 57717 NL FiberXpress BV 7 49335 RU LLC "Server v arendy" 7 134451 SG NewMedia Express Pte Ltd 6 49367 IT Seflow S.N.C. Di Marco Brame' & C. 6 26754 ?? {{unknown organization}} 5 198504 AE Star Satellite Communications Company - PJSC 5 198381 AE Star Satellite Communications Company - PJSC 4 38001 SG NewMedia Express Pte Ltd 4 263812 AR TL Group SRL ( IPXON Networks ) 4 30827 GB Extraordinary Managed Services Ltd 4 42831 GB UK Dedicated Servers Limited 4 37200 NG SimbaNET Nigeria Limited 4 133495 PK Vision telecom Private limited 4 198394 AE Star Satellite Communications Company - PJSC 2 44066 DE First Colo GmbH 2 198247 AE Star Satellite Communications Company - PJSC 2 133933 PK NetSat Private Limited 2 328096 UG truIT Uganda Limited 2 38713 PK Satcomm (Pvt.) Ltd. 2 31122 IE Digiweb ltd 2 46562 US Total Server Solutions L.L.C. 2 13737 US Riverfront Internet Systems LLC 2 11990 US Unlimited Net, LLC 2 20860 GB Iomart Cloud Services Limited 2 45382 KR Ehostict 2 17216 US Dc74 Llc 2 16637 ZA Mtn Sa 2 53999 CA Priority Colo Inc 1 23470 US ReliableSite.Net LLC 1 35074 NG Cobranet Limited 1 19832 ZA Link Data Group 1 43945 IL Netstyle A. Ltd 1 134917 IN Ragsaa Communication pvt. ltd. 1 203833 DE First Colo GmbH ====================================================================== The actual current route announcements corresponding to all of the above are listed in the table given here, which is sorted by ASN: https://pastebin.com/raw/XQyJ8EK2 Footnotes: [1] AS62355 gives all indications of being a false front fradulent network, possibly one that was set up by one or more of the black market dealers involved in this case. There is no actual web site associated with its contact domain (networkdedicated.com) at present, the alleged contact phone number in the associated AS WHOIS record was non-working when I tried it, and the street address given for this entity in Bogotá, Columbia, is one that Google maps cannot locate. Traceroutes to the one and only IPv4 block that is being routed by this AS and that is actually registed to the company itself (185.39.8.0/22 -- issued by RIPE NCC) do not terminate in Columbia, South America, as one would expect based on the WHOIS, but rather such traceroutes dead-end somwhere on the network of core-backbone.com (Core-Backbone GmbH, Germany) in the general vicinity of Amsterdam, Netherlands. Please note also that AS62355 appears to be a "leaf" ASN which is connected to the Internet only via AS202425, IP Volume, Ltd. -- Seyhelles. (See below.) https://bgp.he.net/AS62355 [2] The networks of AS202425 (IP volume, Inc. - Seychelles), AS204655 (Novogara, Ltd. - Netherlands), AS56611 (REBA Communications BV - Netherlands), and AS57717 (FiberXpress BV - Netherlands), are all believed by me to be onwed and controled by a certain pair of Dutch gentlemen named Mr. Ferdinand Reinier Van Eeden and Mr. Bartholomeus Johannes ("Bap") Karreman, both of whom I have previously posted about to the NANOG mailing list. For more information on these characters, please google for "Ecatel" and/or "Quasi Networks". Both of those are, I believe, demonstratably the predecessors of what is nowadays being called "IP volume, Inc." [3] AS199267 (Netstyle A. Ltd. - Israel) and AS43945 (Netstyle A. Ltd. - Israel) belongs to the Israeli gentleman featured in Jan Vermeulen's detailed December 4th report on this whole AFRINIC caper. This is the specific fellow who has been going around passing out fradulent LOAs of such shockingly low quality that one wonders why he even bothers. (But I guess they work well enough in the case of many cash-starved networks hungry fo new customers.) [4] AS26754 was formerly an AFRINIC-assigned ASN which was assigned to the entirely fictitious business entity called "ITC'. That entity appears to have just been an imaginary concoction of Mr. Ernest Byaruhanga, formerly a senior employee of AFRINIC (and now the target of an ongoing crimininal investigation) and/or other AFRINIC insiders who worked with or along side Mr. Byaruhanga to criminally strip assets from AFRINIC and its legacy block holders. The registration for this AS number has now been withdrawn by AFRINIC, thus rendering the ASN itself a bogon. [5] AS19832 ("Link Data Group") is yet another fiction that was manufactured out of (nearly) whole cloth, either by Mr. Byaruhanga and/or by other AFRINIC insiders who were working with him. It is not immediately clear why this ASN is still registered, let alone why its route announcements are still being accepted or propagated anywhere.

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ORG-DTL20-RIPE
by Ronald F. Guilmette 29 Jan '20

29 Jan '20

46.3.0.0/16 46.232.0.0/17 80.243.128.0/20 149.126.192.0/18 https://bgp.he.net/AS55933#_prefixes https://bgp.he.net/AS207636#_prefixes

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] [routing-wg] AS12679 -- 206.195.224.0/19
by Ronald F. Guilmette 29 Jan '20

29 Jan '20

In message <CACWOCC-=kRCxGMO7sodDBWXM9o9kFbdeKW+RK9B1Tihf7cWDOA(a)mail.gmail.com>, Job Snijders <job(a)instituut.net> wrote: >All snide aside, did you report this prefix=E2=80=99s current state to ARIN > through >their fraud form? If not, I'm happy to do so. Negative. I did not do so and I shall not do so. Like all of the RIRs, ARIN's forms and their procedures for dealing with these kinds of issues are, by intent, black holes. I give them the product of my hard work and my diligent effort and research and what do I get back? Do I get a bug bounty? No. Do I get a 10% finders fee for finding the facts that allow some block to be returned to its rightful (legacy) owner or to the RIR free pool? No. Do I get any kind of reward whatsoever? No. Do I at least get a courtesy follow-up after a certain period of time has elapsed, telling me whether they think I am right or wrong? NO! I don't get squat! I don't get either a confirmation, or a rebuttal. In fact I don't get anything at all. I don't even get a polite thank you. But let's just forget about that. Do you really think that me filling some bloody stupid form is really going to chage the process -or- the outcomes? Do you seriously think that YOU filling out the form will have any better effect? If so, I'm going to have to ask you to defend that belief in light of the known facts. Do you really think that ARIN is utterly ignorant about this, even though I got an on-the-record ``no comment'' comment directly from John Curran about it before I even posted it? https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2019-August/102791.html If not, then how do you explain the fact that after 5 months ARIN hasn't lifted a finger to do a damn thing about it? Looking forward to you explaining this to me Job. I'm all ears. Regards, rfg P.S. I don't need to seek out any web forms or any RIR if I want to experience first-hand this level of lethargic and studied inaction. As I like to tell people, if I ever want to experience this kind of utter lack of productive activity... well... I have relatives for that!

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The curious case of 159.174.0.0/16
by Ronald F. Guilmette 29 Jan '20

29 Jan '20

Just posted: https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2020-January/105672.html

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AS12679 -- 206.195.224.0/19
by Ronald F. Guilmette 27 Jan '20

27 Jan '20

Thrift Drug, Inc. of Pennsylvania was bought out in October, 1996 by the Rite Aid pharmacy chain (US): https://www.riteaid.com/corporate/news/-/pressreleases/news-room/1996/rite-… https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thrift_Drug https://opencorporates.com/companies/us_pa/2002644 Unfortunately, the parent company, Rite Aid, never got the memo to tell that that Thrify Drug, Inc owned the legacy IPv4 block 206.195.224.0/19. The results were predictable. This /19 has been repeatedly squatted on in recent years, as shown by RIPEstat: https://stat.ripe.net/widget/routing-history#w.resource=206.195.224.1 2016-08-15 AS42861 RU Foton Telecom, CJSC Network Operation Centre 2017-12-08 AS65075 -- {{reserved ASN}} 2018-03-26 AS28191 BR Jupiter Telecomunicacoes e Informatica Ltda 2019-08-24 AS20473 US Choopa, LLC 2019-10-11 AS12679 RU Iceberg Telecom Ltd. The 206.195.224.0/19 block is currently being squatted on by AS12679, Iceburg Telecom (Moscow). It appears that this ASN is also and likewise squatting on a great number of other blocks as well: https://bgp.he.net/AS12679#_prefixes AS12679 (Iceburg) appears to be a "leaf" ASN, connected to the public Internet only via AS25227 (Avantel, Close Joint Stock Company, Moscow) which it turn appears to be getting more than 3/4ths of its own IPv4 connectivity from AS9002 (RETN): https://bgp.he.net/AS25227 Suggest filtering all route announcements from both AS12679 -and- also AS25227 until they each decide if they would like to be part of the civilized internet. ====================================================================== [Source: whois://whois.arin.net 2020-01-27 04:18:39 UTC] NetRange: 206.195.224.0 - 206.195.255.255 CIDR: 206.195.224.0/19 NetName: THRIFT-NET-1 NetHandle: NET-206-195-224-0-1 Parent: NET206 (NET-206-0-0-0-0) NetType: Direct Assignment OriginAS: AS12679 Organization: Thrift Drug, Inc. (THRIFT) RegDate: 1995-08-03 Updated: 2019-09-24 Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/206.195.224.0 OrgName: Thrift Drug, Inc. OrgId: THRIFT Address: 100 Delta Drive City: Pittsburgh StateProv: PA PostalCode: 15238 Country: US RegDate: 1994-03-15 Updated: 2019-08-14 Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/THRIFT OrgAbuseHandle: WEBBK16-ARIN OrgAbuseName: Webb, Kristi OrgAbusePhone: +1-885-923-1290 OrgAbuseEmail: kwebb(a)thriftdrug.org OrgAbuseRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/WEBBK16-ARIN OrgTechHandle: WEBBK16-ARIN OrgTechName: Webb, Kristi OrgTechPhone: +1-885-923-1290 OrgTechEmail: kwebb(a)thriftdrug.org OrgTechRef: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/WEBBK16-ARIN

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Periodic Reminder: List Conduct
by Brian Nisbet 21 Jan '20

21 Jan '20

Colleagues, It seems that at some point in every large list discussion I am compelled to send a mail of this type. This is not in response to any single mail, rather it is a reminder to all. Please remember to conduct yourselves well on this list, to discuss the matter at hand and not to attack the person writing the email. Most of the list discussion takes place in the appropriate manner, but I realise that when we're discussing matters about which any of us are passionate we can forget this. Ad hominem attacks, general slights, unfounded accusations, and many other things do not contribute to the list discussion. The Co-Chairs can't tell you not to send them by private mail (albeit we'd greatly prefer you didn't) nor to act in this manner in other for a (albeit we'd prefer if you didn't do that either), but we can tell you not to do it here, so please don't. Thank you all for your interest and passion for this subject. Brian Co-Chair, RIPE AA-WG Brian Nisbet Service Operations Manager HEAnet CLG, Ireland's National Education and Research Network 1st Floor, 5 George's Dock, IFSC, Dublin D01 X8N7, Ireland +35316609040 brian.nisbet(a)heanet.ie www.heanet.ie Registered in Ireland, No. 275301. CRA No. 20036270

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@EXT: RE: working in new version of 2019-04 (Validation of "abuse-mailbox")
by Marcolla, Sara Veronica 20 Jan '20

20 Jan '20

Very well put, Sérgio. Thank you for voicing clearly the concern of (at least a part of) the community. We should not forget that, according to the provisions of RIPE NCC audits, “every party that has entered into an agreement with the RIPE NCC is contractually obliged to provide the RIPE NCC with complete, updated and accurate information necessary for the provision of the RIPE NCC services and to assist the RIPE NCC with audits and security checks”. Complete, accurate information goes hand in hand with a duty of care, of promptly taking actions against abuse, and should be accompanied by a social responsibility of trying to make the Internet a safe and secure place for everyone, thus not enabling actively DDoS, spammers, and criminals in general. If the community does not agree that everyone has the right to a safe, spam free, crime free Internet, maybe we have some issue to solve here first. Kind regards, Sara Europol - O3 European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3) Eisenhowerlaan 73, 2517 KK The Hague, The Netherlands www.europol.europa.eu<http://www.europol.europa.eu> From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> On Behalf Of Sérgio Rocha Sent: 16 January 2020 13:38 To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] working in new version of 2019-04 (Validation of "abuse-mailbox") Hi, Agree, This anti-abuse list seems the blocking group to any anit-abuse response measure. It's amazing that nobody cant propose anything without receiving a shower of all sorts of arguments against There is an idea that everyone has to hold, if as a community we cannot organize a policy, one of these days there will be a problem that will make governments take the opportunity to legislate and we will no longer have the free and open internet. There are a feew ideas that is simple to understand: 1 - If you have been assigned a network you have responsibilities, paying should not be the only one. 2 - There is no problem with email, since ever are made solutions to integrate with emails. There is no need to invent a new protocol. Who has a lot of abuse, invests in integrating these emails. 3 - If you have no ability to manage abuse should not have addressing, leave it to professionals. The internet is critical for everyone, the ability for actors to communicate with each other to respond to abuse must exist and RIPE must ensure that it exists. It’s like the relation with local governments, there is a set of information that has to be kept up to date to avoid problems, in RIPE it must be the same. Sergio From: anti-abuse-wg [mailto:anti-abuse-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Fi Shing Sent: 16 de janeiro de 2020 04:55 To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net<mailto:anti-abuse-wg@ripe.net> Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] working in new version of 2019-04 (Validation of "abuse-mailbox") >> Best not to judge the race until it has been fully run. I just do not understand how anyone on this list (other than a criminal or a business owner that wants to reduce over heads by abolishing an employee who has to sit and monitor an abuse desk) could be talking about making it easier for abuse to flourish. It is idiotic and is not ad hominem. This list is filled with people who argue for weeks, perhaps months, about the catastrophic world ending dangers of making an admin verify an abuse address ONCE a year .... and then someone says "let's abolish abuse desk all together" and these idiots emerge from the wood work like the termites that they are and there's no resistance? The good news is that nothing talked about on this list is ever implemented, so .. talk away you criminals. --------- Original Message --------- Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] working in new version of 2019-04 (Validation of "abuse-mailbox") From: "Ronald F. Guilmette" <rfg(a)tristatelogic.com<mailto:rfg@tristatelogic.com>> Date: 1/16/20 11:47 am To: "anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net<mailto:anti-abuse-wg@ripe.net>" <anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net<mailto:anti-abuse-wg@ripe.net>> In message <20200115155949.af7f9f79718891d8e76b551cf73e1563.e548b98006.mailapi@ email19.asia.godaddy.com<mailto:20200115155949.af7f9f79718891d8e76b551cf73e1563.e548b98006.mailapi@%0bemail19.asia.godaddy.com>>, "Fi Shing" <phishing(a)storey.xxx<mailto:phishing@storey.xxx>> wrote: >That is the most stupid thing i've read on this list. Well, I think you shouldn't be quite so harsh in your judgement. It is not immediately apparent that you have been on the list for all that long. So perhaps you should stick around for awhile longer before making such comments. If you do, I feel sure that there will be any number of stupider things that may come to your attention, including even a few from your's truly. Best not to judge the race until it has been fully run. >Which criminal is paying you to say this nonsense, because no ordinary person >that has ever received a spam email would ever say such crap. I would also offer the suggestion that such inartful commentary, being as it is, ad hominem, is not at all likely to advance your agenda. It may have felt good, but I doubt that you have changed a single mind, other than perhaps one or two who will now be persuaded to take the opposing position, relative to whatever it was that you had hoped to achieve. Regards, rfg ******************* DISCLAIMER : This message is sent in confidence and is only intended for the named recipient. If you receive this message by mistake, you may not use, copy, distribute or forward this message, or any part of its contents or rely upon the information contained in it. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the relevant e-mails from any computer. This message does not constitute a commitment by Europol unless otherwise indicated. *******************

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Fw: working in new version of 2019-04 (Validation of "abuse-mailbox")
by ripedenis＠yahoo.co.uk 17 Jan '20

17 Jan '20

Yes of course it would have to be an automated process. A benefit of encrypting all the data is that it keeps the RIPE NCC out of any legal actions that may follow. They are simply a forwarding service and have no other details. cheers denis co-chair DB-WG On Friday, 17 January 2020, 11:59:51 CET, JORDI PALET MARTINEZ via anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net> wrote: I will be fine with this (having RIPE NCC as an intermediator just to send the abuse report), if instead of a web form (or in addition to it), it is possible to automate it, for example RIPE NCC also accepts x-arf via email. RIPE NCC has the obligation to keep the information without disclosing it, so why we need to have a way to encypt it so RIPE NCC can’t read it? Furthermore, this should be an automated process. The staff is not going to handle every report manually. And moreover, in case of a bigger dispute, even if going to the courts, RIPE NCC can provide in a neutral way all the info of what happened. However, I’ve the feeling that in order to get this working, the policy must mandate that all the responser from the operator which customer is producing the abuse, also follow the same path, so: Abuse reporter (Victim or its ISP) -> RIPE NCC -> abuser operator -> RIPE NCC -> abuse reporter Otherwise, there will not be a way for RIPE to have stats of who is responding to abuse cases and who is not, or even simpler than that, what abuse mailboxes get bounced (which will be a policy violation if happens all the time with the same operator). Never mind we decide or not that not-responding is an abuse-c violation. Stats are good, even if not published with operator names. El 17/1/20 1:12, "anti-abuse-wg en nombre de ripedenis--- via anti-abuse-wg" <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net en nombre de anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net> escribió: Hi Sergio As I read through this thread similar ideas came to my mind. The question I would ask is "Is it too late to take a completely different approach to abuse contacts and reporting via the RIPE Database?" Suppose we had a standard form available via the ripe.net website for providing details of abuse. If you are able to find the "abuse-c:" details in the database now then you must know the IP address involved. The RIPE NCC could send the report to the abuse contact taken from the database via the specified IP address. This does not have to be an email interface either. We could look at other options. The RIPE NCC would then at least know if the report was successfully delivered. Using a standard form would make it much easier for the resource holder to interpret the information. Someone said: "Making such a scheme compulsory would be unacceptable to people who wish to interact with network owners without disclosing that in public ..." I have no understanding of the technology involved here, but when I send you a message on WhatsApp it is encrypted end to end. WhatsApp have no idea (they say) of the content of the message. Would it be possible to submit a form on ripe.net in a way that the content of that form is encrypted and sent to the resource holder so the RIPE NCC have no idea of the content of the form? That would satisfy this concern. Regardless of the outcome of the RIPE Database Requirements Task Force, something like this could still be implemented as it is external to the RIPE Database. Food for thought... cheers denis co-chair DB-WG On Wednesday, 15 January 2020, 10:22:28 CET, Sérgio Rocha <sergio.rocha(a)makeitsimple.pt> wrote: Hi, Maybe we can change the approach. If RIPE website had a platform to post abuse report, that send the email for the abuse contact, it will be possible to evaluate the responsiveness of the abuse contact. This way anyone that report an abuse could assess not only the response but also the effectiveness of the actions taken by the network owner. After some time with this evaluations we would easy to realize who manages the reports and even who does not respond at all. Sérgio -----Original Message----- From: anti-abuse-wg [mailto:anti-abuse-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Gert Doering Sent: 15 de janeiro de 2020 08:06 To: Carlos Friaças <cfriacas(a)fccn.pt> Cc: Gert Doering <gert(a)space.net>; anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net> Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] working in new version of 2019-04 (Validation of "abuse-mailbox") Hi, On Wed, Jan 15, 2020 at 07:23:38AM +0000, Carlos Friaças via anti-abuse-wg wrote: > I obviously don't speak for the incident handling community, but i > think this (making it optional) would be a serious step back. The > current situation is already very bad when in some cases we know from > the start that we are sending (automated) messages/notices to blackholes. So why is it preferrable to send mails which are not acted on, as opposed to "not send mail because you know beforehand that the other network is not interested"? I can see that it is frustrating - but I still cannot support a policy change which will not help dealing with irresponsible networks in any way, but at the same time increases costs and workload for those that do the right thing alrady. > To an extreme, there should always be a known contact responsible for > any network infrastructure. If this is not the case, what's the > purpose of a registry then? "a known contact" and "an *abuse-handling* contact" is not the same thing. Gert Doering -- NetMaster -- have you enabled IPv6 on something today...? SpaceNet AG Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Michael Emmer Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann D-80807 Muenchen HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen) Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444 USt-IdNr.: DE813185279 ********************************************** IPv4 is over Are you ready for the new Internet ? http://www.theipv6company.com The IPv6 Company This electronic message contains information which may be privileged or confidential. The information is intended to be for the exclusive use of the individual(s) named above and further non-explicilty authorized disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited and will be considered a criminal offense. If you are not the intended recipient be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited, will be considered a criminal offense, so you must reply to the original sender to inform about this communication and delete it.

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] working in new version of 2019-04 (Validation of "abuse-mailbox")
by Ángel González Berdasco 17 Jan '20

17 Jan '20

Well, I do see the value of an option (a magic email value?) meaning "this entity supports the use of its network for abusive purposes and will take no action on any abuse report". That would save time for everyone involved, and would allow to easily block those networks from accesing ours!

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