- anti-abuse-wg - mailman.ripe.net

@EXT: 2019-03 New Policy Proposal
by Marcolla, Sara Veronica 20 Mar '19

20 Mar '19

Hi all, +1 for the proposal as is. Thank you both Carlos and Jordi for bringing this topic up for discussion. Kind regards, Sara Marcolla Europol - O3 European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3) www.europol.europa.eu ******************* DISCLAIMER : This message is sent in confidence and is only intended for the named recipient. If you receive this message by mistake, you may not use, copy, distribute or forward this message, or any part of its contents or rely upon the information contained in it. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the relevant e-mails from any computer. This message does not constitute a commitment by Europol unless otherwise indicated. *******************

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal
by Karl-Josef Ziegler 20 Mar '19

20 Mar '19

Hello! I'm also supporting this new policy proposal. Best regards, - Karl-Josef Ziegler

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] [routing-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation) to be discussed on Anti-Abuse Working Group Mailing List
by Andrey Korolyov 19 Mar '19

19 Mar '19

> > You can find the full proposal at: > https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03 Hey WG, out of curiosity, why neighboring ASNs are not carrying any responsibility for not filtering out a malicious advertisement from a directly-peered neighbor in the proposal? AFAIU most leaks happen because large parties are letting their ACL loose, not because some state-backed player decides to take a pick on someone's else traffic (though both variants exists). The peer who allows any prefix announcement originating from its direct neighbor is no less responsible for the hijack as the origin AS itself. Could you please suggest a possibility to include that kind of relations (determined by third parties, as currently stated for hijacker's AS in the draft) and measures against a transit/upstream in same manner as they are currently defined for a hijacker? Thanks.

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] [routing-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation) to be discussed on Anti-Abuse Working Group Mailing List
by Daniel Suchy 19 Mar '19

19 Mar '19

Hello, my comments: - section 4.0: Assessers should be under direct community control (voted/approved by community/members), not just defined by NCC. - section 4.0 + 7.0 should define minimal number of assessers - reported incidents (reported by web-form defined at 4.0) should be public, at least some metadata (prefix, offending ASN) to avoid duplicate reports - with indication of assessment stage on that list - Daniel On 3/19/19 1:42 PM, Marco Schmidt wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > A new RIPE Policy proposal, 2019-03, "BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy > Violation", is now available for discussion. > > This proposed policy is of interest to both the Anti-Abuse and Routing > working groups. The chairs of both these working groups have agreed to > keep the discussion on one single mailing list to avoid duplication, and > for formal consideration of the proposal within the RIPE Policy > Development Process. > > You are therefore requested to share your feedback on this proposal with > the Anti-Abuse mailing list. > > The goal of this proposal is to define that BGP hijacking is not > accepted as normal practice within the RIPE NCC service region. > > You can find the full proposal at: > https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03 > > We encourage you to review this proposal and send your comments to > <anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net> before 17 April 2019. > > Kind regards, > > Marco Schmidt > Policy Officer > RIPE NCC > >

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RIPE NCC Report: Law Enforcement Agency Requests 2018
by Linda Slaakweg 19 Mar '19

19 Mar '19

Dear colleagues, We have published a transparency report that details the nature of the requests we received from law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in 2018. You can find the report at: https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-715/ <https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-715/> Kind regards, Linda Slaakweg Legal Counsel RIPE NCC

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Webzilla
by Ronald F. Guilmette 18 Mar '19

18 Mar '19

Perhaps some folks here might be interested to read these two report, the first of which is a fresh news report published just a couple of days ago, and the other one is a far more detailed investigative report that was completed some time ago now. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kenbensinger/dossier-gubarev-russian-h… https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5770258-Fti.html Please share these links widely. The detailed technical report makes it quite abundantly clear that Webzilla, and all of its various tentacles... many of which even I didn't know about until seeing this report... most probably qualifies as, and has qualified as a "bullet proof hosting" operation for some considerable time now. As the report notes, the company has received over 400,000 complaints or reports of bad behavior, and it is not clear to me, from reading the report, if anyone at the company even bothered to read any more than a small handful of those. I have two comments about this. First, I am inclined to wonder aloud why anyone is even still peering with any of the several ASNs mentioned in the report. To me, the mere fact that any of these ASNs still have connectivity represents a clear and self-evident failure of "self policing" in and among the networks that comprise the Internet. Second, its has already been a well know fact, both to me and to many others, for some years now, that Webzilla is by no means alone in the category commonly refered to as "bullet proof hosters". This fact itself raises some obvious questions. It is clear and apparent, not only from the report linked to above, but from the continuous and years-long existance of -many- "bullet proof hosters" on the Internet that there is no shortage of a market for the services of such hosting companies. The demand for "bullet proof" services is clearly there, and it is not likely to go away any time soon. In addition to the criminal element, there are also various mischevious governments, or their agents, that will always be more that happy to pay premium prices for no-questions-asked connectivity. So the question naturally arises: Other than de-peering by other networks, are there any other steps that can be taken to disincentivize networks from participating in this "bullet proof" market and/or to incentivize them to give a damn about their received network abuse complaints? I have no answers for this question myself, but I felt that it was about time that someone at least posed the question. The industry generally, and especially in the RIPE region, has a clear and evident problem that traditional "self policing" is not solving. Worse yet, it is not even discussed much, and that is allowing it to fester and worsen, over time. It would be Good if there was some actual leadership on this issue, at least from -some- quarter. So far I have not noticed any such worth commenting about, and even looking out towards the future horizon, I don't see any arriving any time soon. Regards, rfg

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Webzilla
by Fi Shing 17 Mar '19

17 Mar '19

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Google Privacy Abuse
by Fi Shing 16 Mar '19

16 Mar '19

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Google Privacy Abuse
by Fi Shing 16 Mar '19

16 Mar '19

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Google Privacy Abuse
by Fi Shing 15 Mar '19

15 Mar '19

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