1) With a lot of words about improving trust and safety in Proposal's summary, there is no evidence about issues with trust and safety with uncheked "abuse-c:"

I've seen plenty of evidence and ramifications from first hand experience when abuse notifications go ignored/unanswered.

2) In my experience, real abusers have all their contacts valid (and responsive).

Please share more of your experiences. I've never heard of this claim nor understand what a "real abuser" is.

3) Why only abuse-c have to be checked? There are a lot of different contacts or information, that could be verified.

Because that's where you send abuse notifications. In many cases, these will be critical messages regarding ongoing threats, such as a denial of service attack or malware distribution.

Also, RIPE NCC executive just got extraordinary powers to revoke resource

False - no new powers are granted to RIPE NCC by this proposal.

Troy Mursch

Security Researcher

Bad Packets Report

@bad_packets

(702) 509-1248

On Fri, Feb 16, 2018 at 11:47 AM, Alexander Isavnin <isavnin@gmail.com> wrote:

Thanks for the reminder!

Better late than never.

I strongly oppose to this proposal.

1) With a lot of words about improving trust and safety in Proposal's summary, there is no evidence about issues with trust and safety with uncheked "abuse-c:"
2) In my experience, real abusers have all their contacts valid (and responsive).
3) Why only abuse-c have to be checked? There are a lot of different contacts or information, that could be verified.

Also, RIPE NCC executive just got extraordinary powers to revoke resources. So we have to be very carefull with policies, which may lead to resource revocation just because of e-mail issues (i had such issues with RIPE NCC mail servers).

Plus all other arguments against or concerning about this proposal, raised in discussion previously.

Kind regards,
Alexander Isavnin

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