Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Dear Richard, Thank you for your reply. Regarding your comment on the Sole Designator Model, I would like to highlight that the NTIA requirement you mention refers to the oversight of the IANA function. The replacement of the oversight of the IANA function is described in the ICG proposal. The CCWG draft report, however, refers to the oversight of ICANN. Therefore, the NTIA requirement would not be applicable in this case. With regards to the topic of U.S. Headquarters as part of ICANN's fundamental bylaws, thank you for expressing your agreement to the ASO representatives' position. Kind regards, Athina Fragkouli ASO representative to the CCWG
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:40:37 +0100 From: "Richard Hill" <rhill@hill-a.ch> To: "'Athina Fragkouli'" <athina.fragkouli@ripe.net>, <cooperation-wg@ripe.net> Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Thank you for this.
Please see embedded comments below.
Best, Richard
-----Original Message----- From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2015 16:46 To: cooperation-wg@ripe.net Subject: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Dear colleagues,
I would like to remind you that the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG) has published a third Draft Report, available here: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg-accountability- proposal-work-stream-1-recs-30nov15-en.pdf
Comments can be sent via this webpage: https://www.icann.org/public-comments/draft-ccwg-accountability- proposal-2015-11-30-en
The comment period closes on 21 December 2015 at 23:59 UTC.
SNIP
2. Sole Designator Model
The second Draft Report suggested that these powers would be exercised by changing ICANN?s structure, and introduced a structure called the Sole Membership Model.
During and following the public consultation, objections to this model were expressed. As a result of further discussions and consultations, the third Draft Report introduces a new structure called the Sole Designator Model.
The details of the Sole Designator Model can be found in ANNEX 01 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg-accountability- proposal-annex-1-30nov15-en.pdf).
The following aspects of the model are important to highlight:
- To implement the ?Sole Designator? model, ICANN?s Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees would create a unified entity to enforce their Community Powers. This unified entity will be referred to as the ?Empowered Community?. SO/ACs are not required to have a legal personhood. - Under California law, the Sole Designator has the right to appoint and remove ICANN Board directors, whether individually or the entire Board. Please note that Directors appointed by an SO may only be removed by a decision of that specific SO. The Sole Designator would merely implement their decisions. - If the ICANN Board refused to comply with a decision by the Empowered Community to use the statutory rights, the refusal could be petitioned in a court that has jurisdiction to force the ICANN Board to comply with that decision. - Details of the Community Process defined (including thresholds to start the process and to exercise community power) are described in ANNEX 04 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg-accountability- proposal-annex-4-30nov15-en.pdf)
Do you have any comments with regard to this model?
Paragraph 58 of that proposal shows that the "empowered community" would consist of 5 organizations: ALAC, ASO, GNSO, ccNSO, and GAC. Each of these organizations is an organic component of ICANN, and the majority of them represent the domain name and addressing industries.
Thus, the proposal does not provide for any external accountability or supervision of ICANN: ICANN would be accountable only to entities that are part of ICANN.
In March 2014, NTIA announced that it intended "to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community", see:
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition...
An entity (the "empowered community") that consists of organizations that are organic components of ICANN is obviously not "the global multistakeholdercommunity", nor can it be construed to be representative of that community when 3 out of 5 of the cited organizations represent the domain name and addressing industries.
Consequently, the proposal manifestly fails to meet the main objective enunciated by NTIA, namely that ICANNshould be accountable to a the broad global multistakeholder community. Therefore, I do not agree with recommendations contained in the proposal.
It still seems to me that it would be better to turn ICANN into a proper membership organization, see:
http://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/pdfXXrCnTxCwW.pdf
SNIP
4. U.S. Headquarters as part of the Fundamental Bylaws
In the third Draft Report (as in the first and second Draft Report) the CCWG proposes the incorporation of some ICANN accountability-related provisions from the Affirmation of Commitments into the Bylaws (in particular regarding ICANN?s Mission and Core Values). The CCWG suggested defining these provisions as "Fundamental Bylaws". The concept of Fundamental Bylaws is described in ANNEX 03 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg-accountability- proposal-annex-3-30nov15-en.pdf) of the third Draft Report.
The main difference with the common Bylaws provisions is that while the Board could propose a change to this Bylaws provision, Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees (SO/ACs) with voting rights could block the proposed change (by a 66% vote). On the other hand any change to Fundamental Bylaws would require approval by SO/ACs with voting rights (75% vote).
One of the provisions of the AFfirmation of Commitments requires that ICANN ?remains headquartered in the United States of America?. The CCWG noted that this provision exists already in current ICANN Bylaws, at Article XVIII Section 1:
?OFFICES. The principal office for the transaction of the business of ICANN shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United States of America. ICANN may also have an additional office or offices within or outside the United States of America as it may from time to time establish.?
The CCWG considered whether this provision should also be listed as a Fundamental Bylaw, since it has been suggested that the rest of Affirmation of Commitments provisions be incorporated in the Fundamental Bylaws.
The ASO representatives communicated to the CCWG the following comment:
?There is general support the introduction of Fundamental Bylaws. Regarding, the list of Bylaws that should become Fundamental Bylaws, most of them indeed contain fundamental principles. However, the RIR community does not believe that the requirement for ICANN to remain in the United States of America is fundamental, but rather is an administrative issue.?
I agree. It is not appropriate to case into stone that ICANN must reside in the USA.
SNIP
Dear Atina, Thank you for this and please see embedded comment below. Best, Richard
-----Original Message----- From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli Sent: lundi, 21. décembre 2015 16:36 To: cooperation-wg@ripe.net Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Dear Richard,
Thank you for your reply.
Regarding your comment on the Sole Designator Model, I would like to highlight that the NTIA requirement you mention refers to the oversight of the IANA function. The replacement of the oversight of the IANA function is described in the ICG proposal.
The CCWG draft report, however, refers to the oversight of ICANN. Therefore, the NTIA requirement would not be applicable in this case.
I beg to differ. The oversight in question is the oversight for ICANN's performance of the IANA function, so the NTIA requirement does apply. The issue of the general oversight of ICANN is being handled separately.
With regards to the topic of U.S. Headquarters as part of ICANN's fundamental bylaws, thank you for expressing your agreement to the ASO representatives' position.
Kind regards,
Athina Fragkouli ASO representative to the CCWG
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:40:37 +0100 From: "Richard Hill" <rhill@hill-a.ch> To: "'Athina Fragkouli'" <athina.fragkouli@ripe.net>, <cooperation-wg@ripe.net> Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Thank you for this.
Please see embedded comments below.
Best, Richard
-----Original Message----- From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2015 16:46 To: cooperation-wg@ripe.net Subject: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Dear colleagues,
I would like to remind you that the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG) has published a third Draft Report, available here: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountability - proposal-work-stream-1-recs-30nov15-en.pdf
Comments can be sent via this webpage: https://www.icann.org/public-comments/draft-ccwg-accountability- proposal-2015-11-30-en
The comment period closes on 21 December 2015 at 23:59 UTC.
SNIP
2. Sole Designator Model
The second Draft Report suggested that these powers would be exercised by changing ICANN?s structure, and introduced a structure called the Sole Membership Model.
During and following the public consultation, objections to this model were expressed. As a result of further discussions and consultations, the third Draft Report introduces a new structure called the Sole Designator Model.
The details of the Sole Designator Model can be found in ANNEX 01 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg-
accountabilit
y- proposal-annex-1-30nov15-en.pdf).
The following aspects of the model are important to highlight:
- To implement the ?Sole Designator? model, ICANN?s Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees would create a unified entity to enforce their Community Powers. This unified entity will be referred to as the ?Empowered Community?. SO/ACs are not required to have a legal personhood. - Under California law, the Sole Designator has the right to appoint and remove ICANN Board directors, whether individually or the entire Board. Please note that Directors appointed by an SO may only be removed by a decision of that specific SO. The Sole Designator would merely implement their decisions. - If the ICANN Board refused to comply with a decision by the Empowered Community to use the statutory rights, the refusal could be petitioned in a court that has jurisdiction to force the ICANN Board to comply with that decision. - Details of the Community Process defined (including thresholds to start the process and to exercise community power) are described in ANNEX 04 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountabilit y- proposal-annex-4-30nov15-en.pdf)
Do you have any comments with regard to this model?
Paragraph 58 of that proposal shows that the "empowered community" would consist of 5 organizations: ALAC, ASO, GNSO, ccNSO, and GAC. Each of these organizations is an organic component of ICANN, and the majority of them represent the domain name and addressing industries.
Thus, the proposal does not provide for any external accountability or supervision of ICANN: ICANN would be accountable only to entities that are part of ICANN.
In March 2014, NTIA announced that it intended "to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community", see:
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent- tran sition-key-internet-domain-name-functions
An entity (the "empowered community") that consists of organizations that are organic components of ICANN is obviously not "the global multistakeholdercommunity", nor can it be construed to be representative of that community when 3 out of 5 of the cited organizations represent the domain name and addressing industries.
Consequently, the proposal manifestly fails to meet the main objective enunciated by NTIA, namely that ICANNshould be accountable to a the broad global multistakeholder community. Therefore, I do not agree with recommendations contained in the proposal.
It still seems to me that it would be better to turn ICANN into a proper membership organization, see:
http://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/pdfXXrCnTxCwW.pdf
SNIP
4. U.S. Headquarters as part of the Fundamental Bylaws
In the third Draft Report (as in the first and second Draft Report) the CCWG proposes the incorporation of some ICANN accountability-related provisions from the Affirmation of
into the Bylaws (in particular regarding ICANN?s Mission and Core Values). The CCWG suggested defining these provisions as "Fundamental Bylaws". The concept of Fundamental Bylaws is described in ANNEX 03 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountabilit y- proposal-annex-3-30nov15-en.pdf) of the third Draft Report.
The main difference with the common Bylaws provisions is that while the Board could propose a change to this Bylaws provision, Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees (SO/ACs) with voting rights could block the proposed change (by a 66% vote). On the other hand any change to Fundamental Bylaws would require approval by SO/ACs with voting rights (75% vote).
One of the provisions of the AFfirmation of Commitments requires
Commitments that
ICANN ?remains headquartered in the United States of America?. The CCWG noted that this provision exists already in current ICANN Bylaws, at Article XVIII Section 1:
?OFFICES. The principal office for the transaction of the business of ICANN shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United States of America. ICANN may also have an additional office or offices within or outside the United States of America as it may from time to time establish.?
The CCWG considered whether this provision should also be listed as a Fundamental Bylaw, since it has been suggested that the rest of Affirmation of Commitments provisions be incorporated in the Fundamental Bylaws.
The ASO representatives communicated to the CCWG the following comment:
?There is general support the introduction of Fundamental Bylaws. Regarding, the list of Bylaws that should become Fundamental Bylaws, most of them indeed contain fundamental principles. However, the RIR community does not believe that the requirement for ICANN to remain in the United States of America is fundamental, but rather is an administrative issue.?
I agree. It is not appropriate to case into stone that ICANN must reside in the USA.
SNIP
Dear Richard, According to the ICG proposal the oversight of the IANA function, as a whole, will not be conducted by ICANN. In particular the IANA numbering function will be conducted by the numbers community represented by the five RIRs and the IANA protocol parameters function will be conducted by the IETF community represented by the IAB. With regards to the NTIA requirements, these are addressed by the ICG proposal in pages 59-61 (https://www.ianacg.org/icg-files/documents/IANA-stewardship-transition-propo...). I hope this clarifies the situation. Kind regards, Athina On 21/12/15 16:46, Richard Hill wrote:
Dear Atina,
Thank you for this and please see embedded comment below.
Best, Richard
-----Original Message----- From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli Sent: lundi, 21. décembre 2015 16:36 To: cooperation-wg@ripe.net Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Dear Richard,
Thank you for your reply.
Regarding your comment on the Sole Designator Model, I would like to highlight that the NTIA requirement you mention refers to the oversight of the IANA function. The replacement of the oversight of the IANA function is described in the ICG proposal.
The CCWG draft report, however, refers to the oversight of ICANN. Therefore, the NTIA requirement would not be applicable in this case.
I beg to differ. The oversight in question is the oversight for ICANN's performance of the IANA function, so the NTIA requirement does apply.
The issue of the general oversight of ICANN is being handled separately.
With regards to the topic of U.S. Headquarters as part of ICANN's fundamental bylaws, thank you for expressing your agreement to the ASO representatives' position.
Kind regards,
Athina Fragkouli ASO representative to the CCWG
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:40:37 +0100 From: "Richard Hill" <rhill@hill-a.ch> To: "'Athina Fragkouli'" <athina.fragkouli@ripe.net>, <cooperation-wg@ripe.net> Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Thank you for this.
Please see embedded comments below.
Best, Richard
-----Original Message----- From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2015 16:46 To: cooperation-wg@ripe.net Subject: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Dear colleagues,
I would like to remind you that the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG) has published a third Draft Report, available here: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountability - proposal-work-stream-1-recs-30nov15-en.pdf
Comments can be sent via this webpage: https://www.icann.org/public-comments/draft-ccwg-accountability- proposal-2015-11-30-en
The comment period closes on 21 December 2015 at 23:59 UTC.
SNIP
2. Sole Designator Model
The second Draft Report suggested that these powers would be exercised by changing ICANN?s structure, and introduced a structure called the Sole Membership Model.
During and following the public consultation, objections to this model were expressed. As a result of further discussions and consultations, the third Draft Report introduces a new structure called the Sole Designator Model.
The details of the Sole Designator Model can be found in ANNEX 01 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg-
accountabilit
y- proposal-annex-1-30nov15-en.pdf).
The following aspects of the model are important to highlight:
- To implement the ?Sole Designator? model, ICANN?s Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees would create a unified entity to enforce their Community Powers. This unified entity will be referred to as the ?Empowered Community?. SO/ACs are not required to have a legal personhood. - Under California law, the Sole Designator has the right to appoint and remove ICANN Board directors, whether individually or the entire Board. Please note that Directors appointed by an SO may only be removed by a decision of that specific SO. The Sole Designator would merely implement their decisions. - If the ICANN Board refused to comply with a decision by the Empowered Community to use the statutory rights, the refusal could be petitioned in a court that has jurisdiction to force the ICANN Board to comply with that decision. - Details of the Community Process defined (including thresholds to start the process and to exercise community power) are described in ANNEX 04 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountabilit y- proposal-annex-4-30nov15-en.pdf)
Do you have any comments with regard to this model?
Paragraph 58 of that proposal shows that the "empowered community" would consist of 5 organizations: ALAC, ASO, GNSO, ccNSO, and GAC. Each of these organizations is an organic component of ICANN, and the majority of them represent the domain name and addressing industries.
Thus, the proposal does not provide for any external accountability or supervision of ICANN: ICANN would be accountable only to entities that are part of ICANN.
In March 2014, NTIA announced that it intended "to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community", see:
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent- tran sition-key-internet-domain-name-functions
An entity (the "empowered community") that consists of organizations that are organic components of ICANN is obviously not "the global multistakeholdercommunity", nor can it be construed to be representative of that community when 3 out of 5 of the cited organizations represent the domain name and addressing industries.
Consequently, the proposal manifestly fails to meet the main objective enunciated by NTIA, namely that ICANNshould be accountable to a the broad global multistakeholder community. Therefore, I do not agree with recommendations contained in the proposal.
It still seems to me that it would be better to turn ICANN into a proper membership organization, see:
http://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/pdfXXrCnTxCwW.pdf
SNIP
4. U.S. Headquarters as part of the Fundamental Bylaws
In the third Draft Report (as in the first and second Draft Report) the CCWG proposes the incorporation of some ICANN accountability-related provisions from the Affirmation of
into the Bylaws (in particular regarding ICANN?s Mission and Core Values). The CCWG suggested defining these provisions as "Fundamental Bylaws". The concept of Fundamental Bylaws is described in ANNEX 03 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountabilit y- proposal-annex-3-30nov15-en.pdf) of the third Draft Report.
The main difference with the common Bylaws provisions is that while the Board could propose a change to this Bylaws provision, Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees (SO/ACs) with voting rights could block the proposed change (by a 66% vote). On the other hand any change to Fundamental Bylaws would require approval by SO/ACs with voting rights (75% vote).
One of the provisions of the AFfirmation of Commitments requires
Commitments that
ICANN ?remains headquartered in the United States of America?. The CCWG noted that this provision exists already in current ICANN Bylaws, at Article XVIII Section 1:
?OFFICES. The principal office for the transaction of the business of ICANN shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United States of America. ICANN may also have an additional office or offices within or outside the United States of America as it may from time to time establish.?
The CCWG considered whether this provision should also be listed as a Fundamental Bylaw, since it has been suggested that the rest of Affirmation of Commitments provisions be incorporated in the Fundamental Bylaws.
The ASO representatives communicated to the CCWG the following comment:
?There is general support the introduction of Fundamental Bylaws. Regarding, the list of Bylaws that should become Fundamental Bylaws, most of them indeed contain fundamental principles. However, the RIR community does not believe that the requirement for ICANN to remain in the United States of America is fundamental, but rather is an administrative issue.?
I agree. It is not appropriate to case into stone that ICANN must reside in the USA.
SNIP
Dear Athina, The ICG report is dependent on the recommendations of CWG-Accountability, so it seems clear to me that the oversight of the IANA functions also depends on the recommendations of CWG-Accountability. Since it seems that we have different interpretations, I suggest that we agree to disagree. Best, Richard
-----Original Message----- From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli Sent: lundi, 21. décembre 2015 17:54 To: cooperation-wg@ripe.net Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Dear Richard,
According to the ICG proposal the oversight of the IANA function, as a whole, will not be conducted by ICANN. In particular the IANA numbering function will be conducted by the numbers community represented by the five RIRs and the IANA protocol parameters function will be conducted by the IETF community represented by the IAB.
With regards to the NTIA requirements, these are addressed by the ICG proposal in pages 59-61 (https://www.ianacg.org/icg- files/documents/IANA-stewardship-transition-proposal-EN.pdf).
I hope this clarifies the situation.
Kind regards, Athina
Dear Atina,
Thank you for this and please see embedded comment below.
Best, Richard
-----Original Message----- From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli Sent: lundi, 21. décembre 2015 16:36 To: cooperation-wg@ripe.net Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Dear Richard,
Thank you for your reply.
Regarding your comment on the Sole Designator Model, I would like to highlight that the NTIA requirement you mention refers to the oversight of the IANA function. The replacement of the oversight of the IANA function is described in the ICG proposal.
The CCWG draft report, however, refers to the oversight of ICANN. Therefore, the NTIA requirement would not be applicable in this case.
I beg to differ. The oversight in question is the oversight for ICANN's performance of the IANA function, so the NTIA requirement does apply.
The issue of the general oversight of ICANN is being handled separately.
With regards to the topic of U.S. Headquarters as part of ICANN's fundamental bylaws, thank you for expressing your agreement to the ASO representatives' position.
Kind regards,
Athina Fragkouli ASO representative to the CCWG
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:40:37 +0100 From: "Richard Hill" <rhill@hill-a.ch> To: "'Athina Fragkouli'" <athina.fragkouli@ripe.net>, <cooperation-wg@ripe.net> Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Thank you for this.
Please see embedded comments below.
Best, Richard
-----Original Message----- From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2015 16:46 To: cooperation-wg@ripe.net Subject: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers
Related
Analysis
Dear colleagues,
I would like to remind you that the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG) has published a third Draft Report, available here: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountability - proposal-work-stream-1-recs-30nov15-en.pdf
Comments can be sent via this webpage: https://www.icann.org/public-comments/draft-ccwg-accountability- proposal-2015-11-30-en
The comment period closes on 21 December 2015 at 23:59 UTC.
SNIP
2. Sole Designator Model
The second Draft Report suggested that these powers would be exercised by changing ICANN?s structure, and introduced a
structure
called the Sole Membership Model.
During and following the public consultation, objections to this model were expressed. As a result of further discussions and consultations, the third Draft Report introduces a new structure called the Sole Designator Model.
The details of the Sole Designator Model can be found in ANNEX 01 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountabilit y- proposal-annex-1-30nov15-en.pdf).
The following aspects of the model are important to highlight:
- To implement the ?Sole Designator? model, ICANN?s Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees would create a unified entity to enforce their Community Powers. This unified entity will be referred to as the ?Empowered Community?. SO/ACs are not required to have a legal personhood. - Under California law, the Sole Designator has the right to appoint and remove ICANN Board directors, whether individually or the entire Board. Please note that Directors appointed by an SO may only be removed by a decision of that specific SO. The Sole Designator would merely implement their decisions. - If the ICANN Board refused to comply with a decision by the Empowered Community to use the statutory rights, the refusal could be petitioned in a court that has jurisdiction to force the ICANN Board to comply with that decision. - Details of the Community Process defined (including thresholds to start the process and to exercise community power) are described in ANNEX 04 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountabilit y- proposal-annex-4-30nov15-en.pdf)
Do you have any comments with regard to this model?
Paragraph 58 of that proposal shows that the "empowered community" would consist of 5 organizations: ALAC, ASO, GNSO, ccNSO, and GAC. Each of these organizations is an organic component of ICANN, and
On 21/12/15 16:46, Richard Hill wrote: the
majority of them represent the domain name and addressing industries.
Thus, the proposal does not provide for any external accountability
or supervision of ICANN: ICANN would be accountable only to entities that are part of ICANN.
In March 2014, NTIA announced that it intended "to transition key
Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community", see:
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-
sition-key-internet-domain-name-functions
An entity (the "empowered community") that consists of organizations
tran that are organic components of ICANN is obviously not "the global multistakeholdercommunity", nor can it be construed to be representative of that community when 3 out of 5 of the cited organizations represent the domain name and addressing industries.
Consequently, the proposal manifestly fails to meet the main
objective enunciated by NTIA, namely that ICANNshould be accountable to a the broad global multistakeholder community. Therefore, I do not agree with recommendations contained in the proposal.
It still seems to me that it would be better to turn ICANN into a
proper membership organization, see:
http://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/pdfXXrCnTxCwW.pdf
SNIP
4. U.S. Headquarters as part of the Fundamental Bylaws
In the third Draft Report (as in the first and second Draft
the CCWG proposes the incorporation of some ICANN accountability-related provisions from the Affirmation of Commitments into the Bylaws (in particular regarding ICANN?s Mission and Core Values). The CCWG suggested defining these provisions as "Fundamental Bylaws". The concept of Fundamental Bylaws is described in ANNEX 03 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountabilit y- proposal-annex-3-30nov15-en.pdf) of the third Draft Report.
The main difference with the common Bylaws provisions is that while the Board could propose a change to this Bylaws provision, Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees (SO/ACs) with voting rights could block the proposed change (by a 66% vote). On the other hand any change to Fundamental Bylaws would require approval by SO/ACs with voting rights (75% vote).
One of the provisions of the AFfirmation of Commitments requires
Report) that
ICANN ?remains headquartered in the United States of America?. The CCWG noted that this provision exists already in current ICANN Bylaws, at Article XVIII Section 1:
?OFFICES. The principal office for the transaction of the business of ICANN shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United States of America. ICANN may also have an additional office or offices within or outside the United States of America as it may from time to time establish.?
The CCWG considered whether this provision should also be listed as a Fundamental Bylaw, since it has been suggested that the rest of Affirmation of Commitments provisions be incorporated in the Fundamental Bylaws.
The ASO representatives communicated to the CCWG the following comment:
?There is general support the introduction of Fundamental Bylaws. Regarding, the list of Bylaws that should become Fundamental Bylaws, most of them indeed contain fundamental principles. However, the RIR community does not believe that the requirement for ICANN to remain in the United States of America is fundamental, but rather is an administrative issue.?
I agree. It is not appropriate to case into stone that ICANN must reside in the USA.
SNIP
Hello Richard, I think some of the confusion may have arise from the names proposal(CWG-Stewardship) which has dependencies on the CCWG-accountability report. So as it concerns names, the CCWG-accountability report addresses/contains the mechanisms required to implement the oversight concept proposed by the CWG-stewardship. The oversight for numbers and protocol parameters functions is not addressed in the ccwg report as that is addressed by the respective communities in their proposal. In summary, the ccwg proposal addresses accountability of ICANN as an organisation to the community, including the mechanism required for implementation of the names function oversight proposal. Regards On Dec 21, 2015 4:46 PM, "Richard Hill" <rhill@hill-a.ch> wrote:
Dear Atina,
Thank you for this and please see embedded comment below.
Best, Richard
-----Original Message----- From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli Sent: lundi, 21. décembre 2015 16:36 To: cooperation-wg@ripe.net Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Dear Richard,
Thank you for your reply.
Regarding your comment on the Sole Designator Model, I would like to highlight that the NTIA requirement you mention refers to the oversight of the IANA function. The replacement of the oversight of the IANA function is described in the ICG proposal.
The CCWG draft report, however, refers to the oversight of ICANN. Therefore, the NTIA requirement would not be applicable in this case.
I beg to differ. The oversight in question is the oversight for ICANN's performance of the IANA function, so the NTIA requirement does apply.
The issue of the general oversight of ICANN is being handled separately.
With regards to the topic of U.S. Headquarters as part of ICANN's fundamental bylaws, thank you for expressing your agreement to the ASO representatives' position.
Kind regards,
Athina Fragkouli ASO representative to the CCWG
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:40:37 +0100 From: "Richard Hill" <rhill@hill-a.ch> To: "'Athina Fragkouli'" <athina.fragkouli@ripe.net>, <cooperation-wg@ripe.net> Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Thank you for this.
Please see embedded comments below.
Best, Richard
-----Original Message----- From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2015 16:46 To: cooperation-wg@ripe.net Subject: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis
Dear colleagues,
I would like to remind you that the Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG) has published a third Draft Report, available here: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountability - proposal-work-stream-1-recs-30nov15-en.pdf
Comments can be sent via this webpage: https://www.icann.org/public-comments/draft-ccwg-accountability- proposal-2015-11-30-en
The comment period closes on 21 December 2015 at 23:59 UTC.
SNIP
2. Sole Designator Model
The second Draft Report suggested that these powers would be exercised by changing ICANN?s structure, and introduced a structure called the Sole Membership Model.
During and following the public consultation, objections to this model were expressed. As a result of further discussions and consultations, the third Draft Report introduces a new structure called the Sole Designator Model.
The details of the Sole Designator Model can be found in ANNEX 01 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg-
accountabilit
y- proposal-annex-1-30nov15-en.pdf).
The following aspects of the model are important to highlight:
- To implement the ?Sole Designator? model, ICANN?s Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees would create a unified entity to enforce their Community Powers. This unified entity will be referred to as the ?Empowered Community?. SO/ACs are not required to have a legal personhood. - Under California law, the Sole Designator has the right to appoint and remove ICANN Board directors, whether individually or the entire Board. Please note that Directors appointed by an SO may only be removed by a decision of that specific SO. The Sole Designator would merely implement their decisions. - If the ICANN Board refused to comply with a decision by the Empowered Community to use the statutory rights, the refusal could be petitioned in a court that has jurisdiction to force the ICANN Board to comply with that decision. - Details of the Community Process defined (including thresholds to start the process and to exercise community power) are described in ANNEX 04 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountabilit y- proposal-annex-4-30nov15-en.pdf)
Do you have any comments with regard to this model?
Paragraph 58 of that proposal shows that the "empowered community" would consist of 5 organizations: ALAC, ASO, GNSO, ccNSO, and GAC. Each of these organizations is an organic component of ICANN, and the majority of them represent the domain name and addressing industries.
Thus, the proposal does not provide for any external accountability or supervision of ICANN: ICANN would be accountable only to entities that are part of ICANN.
In March 2014, NTIA announced that it intended "to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community", see:
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent- tran sition-key-internet-domain-name-functions
An entity (the "empowered community") that consists of organizations that are organic components of ICANN is obviously not "the global multistakeholdercommunity", nor can it be construed to be representative of that community when 3 out of 5 of the cited organizations represent the domain name and addressing industries.
Consequently, the proposal manifestly fails to meet the main objective enunciated by NTIA, namely that ICANNshould be accountable to a the broad global multistakeholder community. Therefore, I do not agree with recommendations contained in the proposal.
It still seems to me that it would be better to turn ICANN into a proper membership organization, see:
http://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/pdfXXrCnTxCwW.pdf
SNIP
4. U.S. Headquarters as part of the Fundamental Bylaws
In the third Draft Report (as in the first and second Draft Report) the CCWG proposes the incorporation of some ICANN accountability-related provisions from the Affirmation of
into the Bylaws (in particular regarding ICANN?s Mission and Core Values). The CCWG suggested defining these provisions as "Fundamental Bylaws". The concept of Fundamental Bylaws is described in ANNEX 03 (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg- accountabilit y- proposal-annex-3-30nov15-en.pdf) of the third Draft Report.
The main difference with the common Bylaws provisions is that while the Board could propose a change to this Bylaws provision, Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees (SO/ACs) with voting rights could block the proposed change (by a 66% vote). On the other hand any change to Fundamental Bylaws would require approval by SO/ACs with voting rights (75% vote).
One of the provisions of the AFfirmation of Commitments requires
Commitments that
ICANN ?remains headquartered in the United States of America?. The CCWG noted that this provision exists already in current ICANN Bylaws, at Article XVIII Section 1:
?OFFICES. The principal office for the transaction of the business of ICANN shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United States of America. ICANN may also have an additional office or offices within or outside the United States of America as it may from time to time establish.?
The CCWG considered whether this provision should also be listed as a Fundamental Bylaw, since it has been suggested that the rest of Affirmation of Commitments provisions be incorporated in the Fundamental Bylaws.
The ASO representatives communicated to the CCWG the following comment:
?There is general support the introduction of Fundamental Bylaws. Regarding, the list of Bylaws that should become Fundamental Bylaws, most of them indeed contain fundamental principles. However, the RIR community does not believe that the requirement for ICANN to remain in the United States of America is fundamental, but rather is an administrative issue.?
I agree. It is not appropriate to case into stone that ICANN must reside in the USA.
SNIP
participants (3)
-
Athina Fragkouli -
Richard Hill -
Seun Ojedeji