I am from out of region, and I do not maintain data in the RIPE DB with a view to configuring routing, or to have my prefix originated. I am associated with an agency (another RIR) which is not able to be fully represented inside RIPE DB for logistical reasons but instead operates as an autonomous, un-related space of IRR/WHOIS in the same format (RPSL). Users of that service have come to expect that they can lodge IRR data inside my service, in respect of their prefixes. This seems reasonable. And so we enter the problem of 'which DB, which resources, which region, which authorization, why, how' I too prefer, that for route: objects, we move to an acceptance that the ASN holder is not materially bound to announce simply because there is a route object, the ASN holder is not inherently attacked because they were not asked, and instead we should be accepting the INFORMATION that a route object asserts, first class from SIGNED DATA in a ROA. (sorry for shouting) I understand there is a hypothetical risk that FILTER OWNERS are spammed into a ddos wall of death from the creation of huge numbers of route: objects not referring to them. But, this is not significantly different in my mind, to the risk that I take a valid /32 in IPv6, which I have in eg RIPE and then use the public maintainer to add 2^32-1 sub instances of data which refer to any ASN outside of RIPE, thus killing the entire WHOIS anyway for anyone. Not a hypothetical attack. Its a real one. And, by virtue of the maintainer, it exists now. I believe that transitionally, moving to prevent the out-of-region AS thing in RIPE will impact around 350-400 people who currently assert route: objects depending on this. I believe that is a tractable problem. I believe the addition of a tool to emit route: objects from RIPE RPKI Validator, and possibly the dragon s/w makes this a moot point, because those prefix holders can create objects in RPKI which replace that function, trivially. If the RIPE S/W is modified to stop needing ASN to approve route objects, then users in my region using my WHOIS will be able to create route: objects, while we work on persuading them to create ROA instead. I know APNIC Helpdesk staff would like to be able to stop recommending use of un-secured IRR, and having to mediate the conversation between ASN and INetnum maintainer by hand. They wish to ask if this can be considered as an operational problem. -George On 14 May 2015 at 11:47, Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> wrote:
some folk at euro ixen require route objects in ripe's irr. some folk who get address space from other rirs appear at those euro ixen and wish to peer.
ixps which build route server configurations using ixp manager can apply arbitrary IRR source tags (or combinations) on a per-customer basis.
yes, and peval() and other tools take an IRR instance list. but i have enough windmills without tilting at this one. you wanna peer with brunhilde, you play by her rules.
when i saddle up rosenantes, it is to get all this to be rpki-based origin validation instead.
randy