Dear Sandra, Thank you for this overview. You have cleared some of the mists of time and I am appreciative for that. It appears that over time, the 'root' of the conceptual model shifted from the AS holder to the IP space holder. Interesting. Kind regards, Job On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 07:37:47PM -0400, Sandra Murphy via db-wg wrote:
For those with long memories, why was authorisation required from the origin ASN and is that reason still valid? (I think it was this point that blocked the last attempt to take this option.)
Well, my memory is that the routing registry was designed to express the routing policy of an AS, and all other objects were authorized on the basis of the holder of the AS.
Adding authorization of the prefix holder in addition to the AS was the new authorization step for the route object in RFC2725.
But you should really ask Curtis Villamizar, who did all the heavy lifting of the writing for RFC2725. I recall sitting wide-eyed as Curtis and Carol Orange discussed thorny routing issues.
There are probably people around from RIPE who needed to do the implementation of the trust model. They might remember more.
RIPE-120 of Oct 1994 said:
Special Rules in the Routing Registry
Because routes are originated by autonomous systems the autonomous system concerned should be the only one maintain- ing route objects. The maintainer of a route object is thus expected to be the same as the one of the aut-num object referenced in its origin attribute.
RFC1786 of Mar 1995 says:
Route object update procedures
Adding a route object will have to be authorised by the maintainer of the originating AS. The actual implementation of this is outside the scope of this document. This guarantees that an AS guardian has full control over the registration of the routes it announces [11].
where [11] is a pointer to RIPE-120.
—Sandy
P.S. Carol Orange’s name was on the first two versions of the RFC2725 draft, but disappeared in -02. I don’t know why.