Hi Ronald

I have added some more comments below about this specific ROUTE object you gave as an example.

On 21/11/2016 01:12, Rene Wilhelm wrote:

Hi,

On 11/20/16 10:05 PM, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:

[...]
I have just now been trying to apply those options to a single route
object and so far I am not having any success at all. Are those options
supposed to work for individual route objects? If so, then obviously
I'm just doing it wrong, and getting only errors back. If you could
show me the correct syntax for using these options on individual route
objects, I'd be most greatful. For example, if you could show me how
to view the different verssions of the 36.116.128.0/17 route object,
that would be great.

To query version history for route objects you need to include the
origin AS number in the query. Together with the prefix that identifies
a single route object in the database:

whois -h whois.ripe.net ' --list-versions 36.116.128.0/17AS52523'
[...]

rev# Date              Op.

1     2016-03-12 20:11 ADD/UPD
2     2016-04-25 15:15 ADD/UPD

whois --show-version 1 36.116.128.0/17AS52523

% Version 1 of object "36.116.128.0/17AS52523"
% This version was a UPDATE operation on 2016-03-12 20:11
% You can use "--list-versions" to get a list of versions for an object.

route:          36.116.128.0/17
descr:          EU route
origin:         AS52523
mnt-by:         RIPE-NCC-RPSL-MNT
created:        2016-03-12T19:11:19Z
last-modified: 2016-03-12T19:11:19Z
source:         RIPE

So this is one of those cases which Denis described: the insecure maintainer
RIPE-NCC-RPSL-MNT was replaced by RIPE-NCC-LOCKED-MNT on 2016-04-25.

(It would be very helpful to be able to know who
or what was supposedly maintaining that object, and others of interest
to me, prior to the time when they were set to RIPE-NCC-LOCKED-MNT.

some quick scripting suggests the bulk of the (ipv4) route objects which
have mnt-by RIPE-NCC-LOCKED-MNT today only ever had mnt-by RIPE-NCC-RPSL-MNT
before.

12 route objects have been locked more than a decade ago, due to
deprecation of the NONE authentication scheme. For example:

route:          62.135.0.0/18
descr:          LINKdotNET Route
origin:         AS24863
mnt-by:         RIPE-NCC-LOCKED-MNT
remarks:        Maintainer RIPE-NCC-NONE-MNT removed and object
remarks:        LOCKED by the RIPE NCC due to
remarks:        deprecation of the NONE authentication scheme.
remarks:        Please visit the following URL to unlock this object
remarks: http://www.ripe.net/db/none-deprecation-042004.html
created:        2002-07-30T17:02:26Z
last-modified: 2004-04-30T06:14:23Z
source:         RIPE

-- Rene

If you query this prefix using webupdates and select ' Search resource objects in all available databases' you will see the address range is from APNIC region

    inetnum:         36.96.0.0 - 36.127.255.255
    netname:         CHINANET-ZJ
    descr:           CHINANET Zhejiang province network
    descr:           Data Communication Division
    descr:           China Telecom
    country:         CN
    admin-c:         DUMY-RIPE
    tech-c:          DUMY-RIPE
    notify:          antispam@dcb.hz.zj.cn
    mnt-by:          APNIC-HM
    mnt-lower:       MAINT-CHINANET-ZJ
    mnt-routes:      MAINT-CHINANET-ZJ
    mnt-irt:         IRT-CHINANET-ZJ
    remarks:         --------------------------------------------------------
    remarks:         To report network abuse, please contact mnt-irt
    remarks:         For troubleshooting, please contact tech-c and admin-c
    remarks:         Report invalid contact via www.apnic.net/invalidcontact
    remarks:         --------------------------------------------------------
    status:          ALLOCATED PORTABLE
    source:          APNIC-GRS
    remarks:         ****************************
    remarks:         * THIS OBJECT IS MODIFIED
    remarks:         * Please note that all data that is generally regarded as personal
    remarks:         * data has been removed from this object.
    remarks:         * To view the original object, please query the APNIC Database at:
    remarks:         * http://www.apnic.net/
    remarks:         ****************************

Doing the same for the ASN you see it is from LACNIC region:

    aut-num:         AS52523
    descr:           COMPANHIA PAULISTA DE FORCA E LUZ
    created:         20130521
    source:          LACNIC-GRS
    remarks:         ****************************
    remarks:         * THIS OBJECT IS MODIFIED
    remarks:         * Please note that all data that is generally regarded as personal
    remarks:         * data has been removed from this object.
    remarks:         * To view the original object, please query the LACNIC Database at:
    remarks:         * http://www.lacnic.net/
    remarks:         ****************************

This is what we refer to as an 'out of region' ROUTE object. This is one of the more extreme cases where both the prefix and ASN are outside the RIPE region. But the RIPE Database allows creation of such objects. Currently there is no authorisation done by the real resource holders and no notifications are sent to them that this object has been created in the RIPE Database. The resource holders in APNIC and LACNIC regions may not know this ROUTE object exists. Anyone can create such an object.

This issue has been discussed at several recent RIPE Meetings but no consensus has been reached on how to move forward. But as you point out, there is an added complication now with some of these objects being locked. This was not part of the previous discussion on the subject. So no one is maintaining these objects, no one can delete them and maybe no one wants it to be there. And as you point out below, some people may give this (rogue) object credibility because it exists. Whoever created this object is unlikely to ask the RIPE NCC to unlock it as they may not have any valid reason for it being there. So this object is stuck in limbo... Perhaps if one of the resource holders asks the RIPE NCC to delete it they will do, but someone has to tell the resource holders it exists.

cheers
denis

Anyway, here is my concern... I have just been having an email conversation
with one provider in the RIPE region. I can summarize the conversation
as follows:

       ME: You should not be allowing your peer/customer to announce
            route A.B.C.D/nn.

       HIM: We filter by using the RIPE route registry. There is a route
             object in the RIPE data base that says that our peer/customer
             can announce A.B.C.D/nn.

I am concerned that in some cases the RIPE data base contains some route
objects that should not have been allowed in there in the first place,
and that to make matters worse, some of these now have mnt-by set to
RIPE-NCC-LOCKED-MNT which has _two_ possible ill effects, i.e. (1) it
hides the identity of the party who put the route object into the data
base in the first place and (2) it in effect freezes in place some
improper route objects that should never have gotten into the data base
in the first place. And in some cases, for some of the providers who
may be checking the routes that they either originate or pass against
the RIPE data base, this may have the effect of permanently legitimizing
bogus and perhaps even illicit routes.

I would like to know if anyone other than me thinks this might be an
issue. I mean how will the bogus route objects ever be removed if they
are set to RIPE-NCC-LOCKED-MNT?