In message <637.852810211@dns.dante.org.uk>, Steven Bakker writes:

==> From: Gabor Kiss <kissg@sztaki.hu> ==> Thu, 9 Jan 1997 11:28:52 +0100

CA> I disagree that this is a good idea. If I register the following route CA> object (which actually exists): CA> CA> route: 128.0.0.0/1 CA> descr: HALF-DEFAULT-ONE CA> origin: AS1800 CA> advisory: AS690 1:1800 2:1239 CA> mnt-by: MAINT-AS1800 CA> mnt-lower: MAINT-AS1800 CA> CA> nobody else can register any route objects.

GK> This can be prevented by this object GK> route: 0.0.0.0/0 GK> descr: for authorisation purposes GK> origin: AS0 GK> mnt-lower: MAINT-INTERNIC GK> etc. GK> GK> Internic (or whatever else) may delegate maintainer rights as well GK> as allocates address ranges.

That still doesn't help you if the 128.0.0.0/1 is already registered (which it is); I imagine the proposed auth scheme would look for the most specific enclosing route object, which is 128.0.0.0/1 and not 0.0.0.0/0 (for most routes nowadays anyway).

Steven

128.0.0.0/1 is obviously bogus so remove it. It was placed there for no reason other than to be disruptive and try to undermine the IRR. If the registry that holds 128.0.0.0/1 won't remove it, then the community that is using the IRR may have to exclude that registry. [big hint sent in Merit's direction]. Curtis