Re: Draft minutes from RIPE 56
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Nigel, your minutes contain the following note under "Follow-ups": "* Resource Certification Project The point was raised that the CA-TF work was a focus for actions by lawful authority to remove items from the database. Would we want to record all such actions. This is properly the domain of the DP-TF and some progress on similar topics has already been made. [AP56.1 DP-TF] To consider the action to be taken when legal authority requests the removal of data from the database, and in particular whether records of such actions should be recorded. It was noted that 2008-04 will result in more ROA data for the DB using data derived from the certification effort." http://www.ripe.net/ripe/maillists/archives/db-wg/2008/msg00027.html During the WG meeting at RIPE57 I would like to ask for an update (and since the WG clashes with the Cooperation WG I will probably have to do so via a sock-puppet). My interest isn't merely in whether such forced-deletions would be recorded, but also whether they would be announced publicly, whether the affected assignee would be informed, and indeed whether they should be done at all (and if not, what steps the NCC should take in advance to protect itself from facing legally enforceable demands. The reasons why this is an issue are more clearly minuted in the AOB section to the minutes to RIPE55, as follows: "* External object removal requests (Malcom H.) The issue here is where a legal request might arrive to remove an item from the DB. If this is likely to happen, how should the RIPE NCC respond? At present there is no law that might mandate this, but one might come along. The RIPE DB covers far more than the EU, and this could create a conflict of interest (or even a diplomatic incident). Important that all be aware that this sort of thing is being proposed by certain elements within the EU and we should perhaps think about this." There is clearly a job for the RIPE NCC communications group to make it clear to appropriate bodies what the function of the database actually is [AP55.3 RIPE NCC]. Current RIPE NCC policy on information requests is to first point to the public data, and then if more is required, then require a court order from a Dutch judge. We clearly need to discuss this, but it probably needs discussing in a wider scope but it is very important to have arguments prepared beforehand." http://www.ripe.net/ripe/maillists/archives/db-wg/2007/msg00170.html I believe this is likely to become an important policy issue if certification is a success (meaning, if people start to treat with suspicion routing announcements for address blocks for which the announcer cannot produce a RIPE-NCC-signed certificate). It strikes me that there are four strategies available to the NCC: i) cooperate cheerfully with legal requests to delete objects/revoke certificates; ii) seek to persuade legal authorities to forebear from making such requests voluntarily; iii) locate the database in a jurisdiction where such requests are predicted to be unlikely/rare; iv) reengineer the database so that it is split between competing jurisdictions, such that legal authorities in multiple jurisdictions would need to cooperate in order to compromise the database integrity effectively. The RIPE55 minutes indicate that the NCC is currently pursuing the second strategy. None of these are likely to be risk-free. I can imagine pursuing the fourth strategy would be highly politically controversial. On the other hand, I can imagine an existential political threat were the NCC ever to succumb to a request from a Dutch/European court to revoke an address block allocation (/ certificate) for a non-EU address block. I think the WG should consider carefully whether the current approach is sufficient, and how we should react if it fails. Regards, Malcolm. - -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iEYEARECAAYFAkkFxrwACgkQJiK3ugcyKhTVJACgkkWkugFNkbWINAz2/4unFrcN q2oAn0QvFt9X3sGHAW5kki2DZJxZF1Z5 =maMo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 27/10/2008 13:48, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
"* External object removal requests (Malcom H.) The issue here is where a legal request might arrive to remove an item from the DB. If this is likely to happen, how should the RIPE NCC respond?
During the Cooperation Working Group meeting at RIPE 57, Paul Hoare, an officer with the British Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) gave a presentation in which he asked the RIPE community to find ways to disrupt "criminal ISPs". He cited the example of the Russian Business Network, and gave as an example of what he was looking for the reassignment of RBN's address space to a law enforcement agency that could announce competing routes for RBN's AS. - -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iEYEARECAAYFAkkJT+kACgkQJiK3ugcyKhRYBQCeNMKoaPtnjtpAeXrD6M2/tYA2 nI0An0dWhp0OhmlYzqSb1Nw6thcZ1YRk =xy9e -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (1)
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Malcolm Hutty