- dns-wg - mailman.ripe.net

Re: [dnssec-deployment] .SE releases report on consumer broadband routers
by Patrik Fältström 26 Feb '08

26 Feb '08

Patrik, let me be one of the first that thank you and your team for the hard work in doing this testing. Specifically as I early in this process "complained" that it was hard for us as Cisco to get to know which one (if any) of our products where involved. Thanks! Patrik On 26 feb 2008, at 11.06, Patrik Wallstrom wrote: > "Three of the ten routers that .SE has tested, have passed the test > specification without any remarks. The other seven have had severe > problems when using what might be considered plain Domain Name System > (DNS). The majority of the routers does not manage to pass on DNSSEC > to the client, which gives you problems when there are applications on > the client that want to handle their own DNSSEC validation." > > http://iis.se/about/press?id=135 > > The Excel document describing the result of the tests in more detail > is available on request. > > -- > Patrik Wallström > Project Manager, R&D > .SE (Stiftelsen för Internetinfrastruktur) > E-mail: pawal(a)iis.se > Web: http://www.iis.se/

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ANNOUNCEMENT: RIPE NCC Training Courses.
by RIPE NCC Training Services 21 Feb '08

21 Feb '08

[Apologies for duplicate e-mails] Dear Colleagues, The RIPE NCC invites you to register for one of our upcoming training courses: - The LIR Training Course This course teaches LIRs how to request Internet number resources and interact with the RIPE NCC. A course outline is available at: http://www.ripe.net/training/lir/outline.html - The Routing Registry Training Course This course teaches LIRs how to use the RIPE Database for routing. A course outline is available at: http://www.ripe.net/training/rr/outline.html - The DNS for LIRs Training Course This course teaches LIRs about the RIPE NCC's DNS-related services. A course outline is available at: http://www.ripe.net/training/dns/outline.html To see the location of upcoming courses and to register, please use the LIR Portal or complete the registration form on our website at: http://www.ripe.net/cgi-bin/trainingform.pl.cgi If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact us at <training(a)ripe.net>. Kind regards, Rumy Kanis Training Services Manager RIPE NCC

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IANA introduces AAAA record for K-root
by Anand Buddhdev 13 Feb '08

13 Feb '08

Dear Colleagues, Yesterday, 4 February 2008, at around 17:00 (UTC), IANA introduced AAAA records for six of the root servers in the root server system. One of these servers is k.root-servers.net (2001:7fd::1), which is managed by the RIPE NCC. This change allows the root zone to be queried over IPv6. The K-root IPv6 prefix is currently anycast from the two global nodes, located in Amsterdam and Miami. The introduction of the AAAA records went smoothly, and we are monitoring the query rate and pattern. We are also collecting more detailed information for future analysis. A graph showing the IPv6 query rate for the last 24 hours can be viewed at: http://ripe.net/news/k-root-aaaa-announcement.html More information about AAAA records in the root zone is available at: http://www.iana.org/reports/root-aaaa-announcement.html Regards, -- Anand Buddhdev DNS Services Manager, RIPE NCC

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DNSSEC trust anchors for unsigned zones
by Alexander Gall 30 Jan '08

30 Jan '08

Hi The current set of trust anchors distributed by RIPE NCC (<https://www.ripe.net/projects/disi/keys/ripe-ncc-dnssec-keys-new.txt>) includes the domains disi.nl example.net pwei.net None of these currently have any DNSSEC resource records (i.e. they are insecure), which effectively brakes those zones for everybody who uses that particular set of trust anchors. I guess this shows one of the operational problems with trust anchor management. These zones are not maintained by RIPE NCC itself and the administrators probably didn't bother to tell them that they've disabled DNSSEC (if they know or remember at all that their keys are distributed by a third party). I guess it would be more prudent for RIPE NCC to only distribute the keys for their own zones (those listed on <https://www.ripe.net/projects/disi//keys/>). -- Alex

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AAAA records to be added for root servers
by Barbara Roseman 07 Jan '08

07 Jan '08

apologies for cross-posting... On 4 February 2008, IANA will add AAAA records for the IPv6 addresses of the four root servers whose operators have requested it. A technical analysis of inserting IPv6 records into the root has been done by a joint working group of ICANN's Root Server System Advisory Committee and Security and Stability Advisory Committee, a report of which can be found at http://www.icann.org/committees/security/ sac018.pdf. Network operators should take whatever steps they feel appropriate to prepare for the inclusion of AAAA records in response to root queries. More information will be posted to the IANA web site during January. Regards, Barbara Roseman IANA General OperationsManager ICANN

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Re: [dnssec-deployment] [dns-wg] RE: [dnssec-deployment] Ny nyckelsigneringsnyckel (KSK) för .SE - New key signing key (KSK) for .SE
by Holger Zuleger 07 Jan '08

07 Jan '08

> As a developer I have a question about revoke bits. > > In a DNSKEY RRset that revokes A and also has keys B and C. Does A sign > (A+B+C) or does the signature from A only sign A? In theory, only the signing of A is required, but don't care about the additional signing of B+C. > Signing more than simply A is nonsense, since the key is revoked. > And aids storing a presigned-self-revocation for emergency use. > However, that is not standard for RRset signatures. > > Do signatures from B and C sign (A+B+C) or (B+C) ? They have to sign (A+B+C) BTW, be aware of key tag changing if you set the revoke bit. Holger

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RE: [dnssec-deployment] Ny nyckelsigneringsnyckel (KSK) för .SE - New key signing key (KSK) for .SE
by richard.lamb 07 Jan '08

07 Jan '08

I agree it would be unrealistic to set it for a production zone like .se yet. However, I like the idea of "exercising" the REVOKE bit so that potential developers see it. Would it break anything in BIND resolvers to do so? If not, id like to set it every time I change KSKs in our demo. -----Original Message----- From: DNSSEC deployment [mailto:dnssec-deployment@shinkuro.com] On Behalf Of Holger Zuleger Sent: Friday, January 04, 2008 1:11 AM To: DNSSEC deployment Cc: Patrik Wallstrom; Anne-Marie.Eklund-Lowinder(a)iis.se; dns-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [dnssec-deployment] Ny nyckelsigneringsnyckel (KSK) för .SE - New key signing key (KSK) for .SE Patrik Wallstrom wrote: > On Thu, 03 Jan 2008, Holger Zuleger wrote: > >>> New key signing key (KSK) for .SE >>> As from today, 2008-01-03 .SE publish and take into use a new KSK for >>> signing the .SE zone file. The key published with start 2006 with key >>> id = 17686 is unvalid since 2008-01-01 and will be removed >>> 2008-02-01. You should have configured the key published with start >> Would it be possible to set the REVOKE Bit on that key, and announce it for >> another 30 days? > > There was no time to fix this for this rollover. Next time. Oh, sure, it's clear that no one want's to add a new functionality on a productive service without testing, even if it is just to set one bit. But I thought that it was a good time to bring rfc5011 in mind... >> Doing so enables a rfc5011 aware validator to discard the key automatically >> from the list of possible trust anchor. > > Which resolvers honors the revocation bit? To my knowledge, no swedish > resolver operators are using such software yet. I think you are right. I guess that actually no one use it. Small question to all the dnssec operators: Please raise your hand if I'm wrong. ;-) And to the bind guys: Honors bind, used as an dnssec validator, the revoke bit? Holger

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Re: [dnssec-deployment] Ny nyckelsigneringsnyckel (KSK) för .SE - New key signing key (KSK) for .SE
by Patrik Wallstrom 04 Jan '08

04 Jan '08

On Thu, 03 Jan 2008, Holger Zuleger wrote: >> New key signing key (KSK) for .SE >> As from today, 2008-01-03 .SE publish and take into use a new KSK for >> signing the .SE zone file. The key published with start 2006 with key >> id = 17686 is unvalid since 2008-01-01 and will be removed >> 2008-02-01. You should have configured the key published with start > Would it be possible to set the REVOKE Bit on that key, and announce it for > another 30 days? There was no time to fix this for this rollover. Next time. > Doing so enables a rfc5011 aware validator to discard the key automatically > from the list of possible trust anchor. Which resolvers honors the revocation bit? To my knowledge, no swedish resolver operators are using such software yet. -- patrik_wallstrom->foodfight->pawal(a)blipp.com->+46-733173956

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Re: [dnssec-deployment] Ny nyckelsigneringsnyckel (KSK) för .SE - New key signing key (KSK) for .SE
by Holger Zuleger 03 Jan '08

03 Jan '08

> New key signing key (KSK) for .SE > > As from today, 2008-01-03 .SE publish and take into use a new KSK for > signing the .SE zone file. The key published with start 2006 with key > id = 17686 is unvalid since 2008-01-01 and will be removed > 2008-02-01. You should have configured the key published with start Would it be possible to set the REVOKE Bit on that key, and announce it for another 30 days? Doing so enables a rfc5011 aware validator to discard the key automatically from the list of possible trust anchor. Without it, the key ends up in state missing on the validator side. <quote rfc5011> Missing This is an abnormal state. The key remains a valid trust- point key, but was not seen at the resolver in the last validated DNSKEY RRSet. This is an abnormal state because the zone operator should be using the REVOKE bit prior to removal. </quote> So setting the revoke bit, would be one step to make the zone more compatible to RFC5011 (Automated Updates of DNS Security Trust Anchors) which is a way forward in implementing and using DNSSEC even without a signed root (and in absence of an elsewere trustable TAR). BTW: The same is true for all other signed TLDs and the signed zones managed by RIPE as well. Greets Holger

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Bad secure delegation of ris.ripe.net
by Alexander Gall 13 Dec '07

13 Dec '07

Hello DISI The zone ris.ripe.net is bogus. It appears that the DS RR doesn't match the KSK DNSKEY RR. ripe.net is fine (with the newest trust anchors). According to drill: : gall@hadron[gall]; cat /tmp/ripe.key ripe.net. IN DNSKEY 257 3 5 AwEAAZ+vLzvkn0wkjcSmpoZRIOU0Suaw1EegrH9T0vwGOG9EbdgBYs6p 1lyjy2aHfZ4EnhVVVsElpSMBFzKItwzJeR9jxZC23dHw57saKC6enu7K K0m3fUQagzHqcu5RKn/T+0w1Q51UTdsLiBfCpqzQ10+T1oRxCXYWOyIi jApUQCFvybf1U6S/7lOLagzzoSU6lzxcUivWxLEM0SbzYIoV1OWXIjnj X/7/ChvZPqr01iY9th4nXlK52Da0mPaPbunLF353s4LQ6CsmcFG3zCfg 6iYRugF/NE1uMbdpzsff7nV1/K4PdSJjLt/AKsofQbbca8zH6YEolTcA T8o18/H13jE= : gall@hadron[gall]; drill -S -k /tmp/ripe.key ripe.net. soa | tail -5 DNSSEC Trust tree: ripe.net. (SOA) |---ripe.net. (DNSKEY keytag: 62805) |---ripe.net. (DNSKEY keytag: 21238) ;; Chase successful : gall@hadron[gall]; drill -S -k /tmp/ripe.key ris.ripe.net. soa | tail -5 ris.ripe.net. (SOA) |---ris.ripe.net. (DNSKEY keytag: 51156) |---ris.ripe.net. (DNSKEY keytag: 21022) No trusted keys found in tree: first error was: No DNSSEC public key(s) ;; Chase failed. The keytag of the DS record is 56179 : gall@hadron[unbound]; dig ris.ripe.net. ds +short 56179 5 1 B8F1169306DA0679416580D5AC3F43572B3318B6 -- Alex

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