- dns-wg - mailman.ripe.net

Signing of the ARPA zone
by Joe Abley 10 Mar '10

10 Mar '10

Colleagues, This is a technical, operational announcement regarding changes to the ARPA top-level domain. Apologies in advance for duplicates received through different mailing lists. No specific action is requested of operators. This message is for your information only. The ARPA zone is about to be signed using DNSSEC. The technical parameters by which ARPA will be signed are as follows: KSK Algorithm and Size: 2048 bit RSA KSK Rollover: every 2-5 years, scheduled rollover to follow RFC 5011 KSK Signature Algorithm: SHA-256 Validity period for signatures made with KSK: 15 days; new signatures published every 10 days ZSK Algorithm and Size: 1024 bit RSA ZSK Rollover: every 3 months ZSK Signature Algorithm: SHA-256 Authenticated proof of non-existence: NSEC Validity period for signatures made with ZSK: 7 days; zone generated and re-signed twice per day The twelve root server operators [1] will begin to serve a signed ARPA zone instead of the (current) unsigned ARPA zone during a maintenance window which will open at 2010-03-15 0001 UTC and close at 2010-03-17 2359 UTC. Individual root server operators will carry out their maintenance at times within that window according to their own operational preference. The trust anchor for the ARPA zone will be published in the ITAR [2], and in the root zone in the form of a DS record once the root zone is signed. If you have any concerns or require further information, please let me know. Regards, Joe Abley Director DNS Operations, ICANN [1] <http://www.root-servers.org/> [2] <https://itar.iana.org/>

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Ripe-60 coming up
by Jaap Akkerhuis 08 Mar '10

08 Mar '10

Folks, Over two months RIPE-60 will take place in Prague from 3 to 7 May. According to the meeting plan, the DNS-WG meeting will be Thursday the 6th. Please send suggestions for agenda items and/or presentations to the chairs (dns-wg-chair(a)ripe.net) or directly to me. Note that the (draft) minutes of Ripe-59 are available in the usual place. If there are comments, for these it would be nice to receive them before the meeting s these can incorporated swiftly. Regards, jaap Ripe-60: <http://www.ripe.net/ripe/meetings/ripe-60/> Meeting-plan: <http://www.ripe.net/ripe/meetings/ripe-60/meeting-plan.html> Minutes: <http://www.ripe.net/ripe/wg/dns/r59-minutes.html>

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specify dns for reverse lookup
by Athiqur Rahman 25 Feb '10

25 Feb '10

I have the 217.73.64.0/20 IP block assigned to me. I am trying to setup some reverse DNS records. I created the zone 64.73.217.in-addr.arpa which is answering queries fine. However when I create any other zone files withing that /20, they do not answer the queries. I have logged into the RIPE website and am trying to find where the DNS is specified for an IP range but can not seem to find it. Any advice on how to proceed with this problem?

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Outdated RIPE NCC Trust Anchors in Fedora Linux Repositories
by Anand Buddhdev 08 Feb '10

08 Feb '10

[Apologies for duplicates] Dear Colleagues, We have discovered that recent versions of the Fedora Linux distribution are shipping with a package called "dnssec-conf", which contains the RIPE NCC's DNSSEC trust anchors. This package is installed by default as a dependency of BIND, and it configures BIND to do DNSSEC validation. Unfortunately, the current version of this package (1.21) is outdated and contains old trust anchors. On 16 December 2009, we had a key roll-over event, where we removed the old Key-Signing Keys (KSKs). From that time, BIND resolvers running on Fedora Linux distributions could not validate any signed responses in the RIPE NCC's reverse zones. If you are running Fedora Linux with the standard BIND package, please edit the file "/etc/pki/dnssec-keys//named.dnssec.keys", and comment out all the lines in it containing the directory path "production/reverse". Then restart BIND. This will stop BIND from using the outdated trust anchors. If you do want to use the RIPE NCC's trust anchors to validate our signed zones, we recommend that you fetch the latest trust anchor file from our website and reconfigure BIND to use it instead of the ones distributed in the dnssec-conf package: https://www.ripe.net/projects/disi/keys/index.html Please remember to check frequently for updates to our trust anchor file, as we introduce new Key-Signing Keys (KSKs) every 6 months. Regards, Anand Buddhdev, DNS Services Manager, RIPE NCC

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Measuring DNS Transfer Sizes - First Results
by Daniel Karrenberg 05 Feb '10

05 Feb '10

Apologies for the inevitable duplicates. You might be interested in reading about our measurements of real obtained DNS transfer sizes in relation to clients requesting DNSSEC responses. See here http://labs.ripe.net/content/measuring-dns-transfer-sizes-first-results Daniel

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L-Root Maintenance 2010-01-27 1800 UTC - 2000 UTC
by Mehmet Akcin 25 Jan '10

25 Jan '10

Hi As part of staged, incremental deployment of DNSSEC in the root zone L-Root will begin serving a Deliberately Unvalidatable Root Zone (DURZ) after the completion of its scheduled maintenance at 2010-01-27 1800 UTC - 2000 UTC Please contact L-Root NOC via noc(a)dns.icann.org or T: +1.310.301.5817 if you have any questions. Please contact with rootsign(a)icann.org if you have any questions regarding DNSSEC Deployment at root zone. Regards Joe Abley / Mehmet Akcin / Dave Knight ICANN DNS Ops / L-ROOT

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Reverse DNS Outage Announcement
by Sjoerd Oostdijck 22 Jan '10

22 Jan '10

[Apologies for duplicates] Dear Colleagues, At 13:50 on Thursday, 21 January, an error was introduced into the RIPE NCC's reverse DNS provisioning system. This caused reverse DNS delegations to stop working for allocations in the following range: 77.0.0.0 to 77.220.7.255 This error was triggered by an internal cleanup of our Early Registration Transfer (ERX) DNS delegations, which was being conducted as part of the RIPE NCC's Registration Data Quality (RDQ) project. The reverse DNS provisioning system was corrected again on 22 January at 09:50 (UTC). However, due to negative caching in DNS resolvers, the problem may have remained visible for a further two hours. The RIPE NCC is currently revising the reverse DNS provisioning system to prevent errors such as this occurring in future. If you have any questions or comments, please send an email to <ncc(a)ripe.net>. Regards, Sjoerd Oostdijck DNS Services Group, RIPE NCC

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DNSSEC signed version of .PT
by Sara Monteiro 13 Jan '10

13 Jan '10

FYI - Apologies if you have already seen this on other lists. Sara Monteiro Pedro Veiga wrote, On 12-01-2010 14:36: > Dear colleagues, > > I'm glad to inform that we have signed the ccTLD .PT in the beginning of > 2010 and the DNSSEC signed version of .pt is in production since 4th of > January. > > For the outside world the .pt infrastructures didn't change, we still > have the same primary name server and a half a dozen of secondaries > (with dnssec-awareness), but we did add an hidden primary where the > signing it's made using an HSM to generate and store the keys. > > We are still working to improve the DNSSEC service in the administrative > side, and we hope to make it available to or Registrars/Registrants in > the next month. > > We are scheduling DNSSEC Technical Workshops to your Registrars and NREN > - National Research and Education Network since they are more proactive > and have the human resources and means to do it. We also have single > registrants with the enough DNS knowledge developing DNSSEC as well, > with the help of the documentation that we made available and also by > direct contact via email and phone. > > Further information, as .pt trust anchor it's available at: > > http://www.dnssec.pt/ > > (also available by mailing list. Send an email to info(a)dnssec.pt to > subscribe) > > Best Regards, > > Pedro Veiga > >

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RIPE58 minutes
by Jim Reid 10 Jan '10

10 Jan '10

Colleagues, a combination of miscommunication and confusion by the WG co-chairs has meant that the RIPE58 minutes went astray. Until now.... Sorry about that. I thought the minutes had been circulated just before RIPE59. They hadn't. And then assumed in Lisbon that the WG's silence about the RIPE58 minutes meant they could be approved by the WG. Which was wrong too. Oh well. Apologies are also due to the NCC staff who (a) sent your WG co-chairs the minutes before RIPE58 ended; (b) politely nagged us a few times to get the minutes out; (c) had extra hassle keeping the WG web pages up to date. Here they are. Please submit any comments or corrections to the list.

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A Review of Administrative Tools for DNSSEC
by Rickard Bellgrim 22 Dec '09

22 Dec '09

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Hi .SE (The Internet Infrastructure Foundation) has together with Certezza produced a report that show the current state of administrative tools for DNSSEC. The report is a summary of the functionality of some leading DNSSEC management tools. The focus of the examination has been on DNSSEC signing and key management functionality. An important part of the work has been to specify a set of user review points. It is our belief that the review points are fairly general and as such can be used in similar reviews in the future. The key finding in the study is that there has been a substantial development of DNSSEC tools during the last year, but in a few areas some improvement work still remains. In general the product standard is good and the tested products work as expected. We hope that this product review facilitates the deployment of DNSSEC and would also encourage others to follow up on this work. Please, read the review here: http://www.iis.se/docs/DNSSEC-Admin-tools-review-1.01.pdf // Rickard Bellgrim -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 9.8.3 (Build 4028) Charset: utf-8 wsBVAwUBSzC73+CjgaNTdVjaAQg0oAf+JuByCwfqLWCqje4DV/lg1ih9+9+MAeFe kS2HEEVd2rX0x7z+IjRyYz06U39lQsfeOURl2Eby/nOHc54Anw7TLR8u2zTmDZ68 UFCND/8DY7be6AY6uuvPRLx8L0RUpjRMLZSEjbkECXydmNslejuxZkm5nVVl+EKQ 2oc0BioEZ1uyQuvfT+BBD3g4D/gdZihlpF4pg2ey+nGC5bhO2PaTMjBYq+Y//M7L 2JvT/sesT+5KJDkwnBY1aVeplqWS823fIcbdK89bP36GZTjt9gV61OoYuY+PK4h3 47z3MIFyVpDA447i/YH4yxKd5qNpHfEOOwgCRR6nlOHfmMOMXhEkkg== =S0WO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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