October 2022 - ncc-services-wg

Final Cloud Strategy Published
by Felipe Victolla Silveira 13 Sep '23

13 Sep '23

Dear colleagues, We have now published the final version of our cloud strategy, which was approved by our Executive Board at its last meeting in September. You can find this on RIPE Labs here: https://labs.ripe.net/author/felipe_victolla_silveira/ripe-ncc-cloud-strate… <https://labs.ripe.net/author/felipe_victolla_silveira/ripe-ncc-cloud-strate…> Those of you who read our earlier draft won't find any surprises in the document. Apart from making it more concise, the only change is that the use of containers is now allowed under the strict interpretation of our 'Avoid vendor lock-in' requirement (this is noted in the table). The final part is to agree on the criticality of specific services with the community. We will give you an update on this at RIPE 83. Regards Felipe Victolla Silveira Chief Operations Officer RIPE NCC

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A friendly reminder!
by Rob Evans 02 Nov '22

02 Nov '22

Dear colleagues, We understand that the invasion of Ukraine has put a lot of pressure on Ukrainian network operators. There are likely to be differences of opinion on how to handle any potential proposal to restrict, or not, the sale or transfer of resources, and all WG members are free to put their case forward for either side of the argument. However, this is a friendly reminder to keep the discussion open and civil, respecting others' viewpoints. Please also keep the discussion to the topics within the charter of this working group. Many thanks, Rob, Kurtis, Bijal NCC Services WG Co-chairs

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Re: [ncc-services-wg] UA IP transfers situation
by Viktoriia Opanasiuk 31 Oct '22

31 Oct '22

Hi All ! > Hi All! > > Let me point out what is happening with Ukrainian resources > transfers. > > We are now facing with the hugest government based attack > against our basic principles of government free self > regulation. > > I think the real target of the attacker is to obtain > a financial gain from IPv4 market. > > First, the deputy of Ukrainian Parliament Olexandr Fedienko > wrote a letter to RIPE NCC with the initiative of hand-checking > transfer requests with Ukrainian government agency. This idea > was not accepted neither by Ukrainian, nor by European > community. People understand this is a step out from RIPE > community self-governance and the source of corrupted money for > this agency as it should decide either pass the transfer or > not. > > After that initiative was rejected, Fedienko with the help of > his representatives at the RIPE 85 meeting in Belgade tried to > ban all the transfers outside Ukraine. His representatives > promoted a set of very expressive and emotional speeches about > possible forced transfers. He also used his power and pushed > a set of Ukrainian companies to register online to RIPE 85 (and > for some reason - for GM, I think he just don't understand the > difference) and to send a copy-pasted message about support of > the ban. > > The idea is to close the market, limiting the transfers only to > Ukrainian companies. The proposal is to temporarily deny ALL transfers, inside and outside of Ukraine, so that all resource holders will remain with what they have, and nobody could possibly get hold of their resources. > And to buy resources almost for free, as the war pushes people > to sell it, while the buy offers are very limited. It looks > logical. But their arguments for the ban are not. This is very hypothetical scenario, based on wrong assumption, described one paragraph above. And even if that assumption would not be wrong, it is quite unrealistic that Ukrainian companies that maintain infrastructure and struggle to rebuild networks on destroyed or de-occupied territories are going to sell their IP addresses to get some profit - they do not have enough of them already, how are they going to get more? On the other hand, there is quite real scenario for companies whose business is based on re-selling IP addresses or providing "services" of moving resources out of Ukraine, including the one that Max Tulyev announced just several days ago ( https://www.facebook.com/mt6561/posts/pfbid0273c1ndwbZXBLc9ST7sFwisCC9o8Bw9… ). Such businesses will not thrive if the transfers will be frozen. Of course, these companies are also part of the RIPE community. But the community could choose what values it supports. > They said they need the whole-Ukrainian ban to protect > resources at the distressed areas against the forced transfer. > > First, while RIPE NCC accepts "documents" issued on the > occupied territories based on LPR/DPR/Russian jurisdiction, > this ban of Ukrainian resources transfer can be easily avoided > just using these "documents". Including for the real forced > transfers. It isn't clear what is the problem you describe here. However, it is a problem that many companies from those territories are registered by RIPE NCC based on registration papers issued either by russia or dnr/lnr, and therefore might not be seen as Ukrainian. Ideally RIPE NCC should block transfers of companies registered on the whole internationally recognized territory of Ukraine, including all occupied territories. > Second, it is nothing to do with Ukrainian companies based on > the territories not in the distress area. From the war front > line to for example Uzhgorod city there are ~800km and 2000m > high mountains. Why should we complicate the life for these > companies? For someone who fled the country it might seem that there are distressed areas and areas "behind high mountains". But the reality in Ukraine is that the whole country is distressed. There are companies registered in what you describe as "safe areas", but they have representatives on all territory of the country, including occupied areas. Or the head of a company in the "safe" territory could have relatives who are under occupation. In all such cases they could be threatened and forced to sign transfer documents. > Third, it is unclear why transfers inside Ukraine should not be > banned for the time the policy is being updated. If we really > have the problem, it is logical to ban all transfers. Again, the proposal is to temporarily hold all transfers of Ukrainian holders. > Forth, I asked many times to show any example of the forced > transfer in the distress area. They can't. I did not hear any > of these situations myself. So for me the problem they are > trying to solve did not even exist. > > This situation with the possible country-wide transfer ban rose > a big discussion in Telecom Ukraine telegram channel, which is > a discussion point for a lot of (but not all) Ukrainian > Internet and telecom companies. > > Instead of explaining things for my requests, Olexandr Fedienko > call me there a hidden Russian FSB agent, and Olena Kushnir > said I do not understand that "we should keep a valuable > resource inside our country during the war". But sorry, these > are definitely not their resources! So they should not tell > holders what to do with it, until we are not live in > a Communist country where all things belongs to the government. > > This situation makes deeply concern Ukrainian community and > resources holders. We are really afraid some of this proposals > will be implemented without consensus inside Ukrainian > community, just because of government letters, emotional > speeches. And definitely without any "closed meetings" (C) > Olena Kushnir with NCC staff inaccessible for people with > another opinion. > > It will be so kind if RIPE NCC officials release a statement > where they clearly state they will not implement any bans for > resource holders not in the distress area. And any changes on > the policy will be implemented with the current policy > development process, consensus, and in the co-operation with > all community. This will calm down the situation and will > convince people that NCC really respects and protects the > interests of the community members. > > Thank you very much for the long reading! > And in the end it will be better if we focus our efforts on solving the problem, and not on writing a hypothetical stories. The discussion should be constructive and effective. Thanks. Viktoriia Opanasiuk

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Re: [ncc-services-wg] UA IP transfers situation
by Viktoriia Opanasiuk 31 Oct '22

31 Oct '22

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UA IP transfers situation
by Max Tulyev 30 Oct '22

30 Oct '22

Hi All! Let me point out what is happening with Ukrainian resources transfers. We are now facing with the hugest government based attack against our basic principles of government free self regulation. I think the real target of the attacker is to obtain a financial gain from IPv4 market. First, the deputy of Ukrainian Parliament Olexandr Fedienko wrote a letter to RIPE NCC with the initiative of hand-checking transfer requests with Ukrainian government agency. This idea was not accepted neither by Ukrainian, nor by European community. People understand this is a step out from RIPE community self-governance and the source of corrupted money for this agency as it should decide either pass the transfer or not. After that initiative was rejected, Fedienko with the help of his representatives at the RIPE 85 meeting in Belgade tried to ban all the transfers outside Ukraine. His representatives promoted a set of very expressive and emotional speeches about possible forced transfers. He also used his power and pushed a set of Ukrainian companies to register online to RIPE 85 (and for some reason - for GM, I think he just don't understand the difference) and to send a copy-pasted message about support of the ban. The idea is to close the market, limiting the transfers only to Ukrainian companies. And to buy resources almost for free, as the war pushes people to sell it, while the buy offers are very limited. It looks logical. But their arguments for the ban are not. They said they need the whole-Ukrainian ban to protect resources at the distressed areas against the forced transfer. First, while RIPE NCC accepts "documents" issued on the occupied territories based on LPR/DPR/Russian jurisdiction, this ban of Ukrainian resources transfer can be easily avoided just using these "documents". Including for the real forced transfers. Second, it is nothing to do with Ukrainian companies based on the territories not in the distress area. From the war front line to for example Uzhgorod city there are ~800km and 2000m high mountains. Why should we complicate the life for these companies? Third, it is unclear why transfers inside Ukraine should not be banned for the time the policy is being updated. If we really have the problem, it is logical to ban all transfers. Forth, I asked many times to show any example of the forced transfer in the distress area. They can't. I did not hear any of these situations myself. So for me the problem they are trying to solve did not even exist. This situation with the possible country-wide transfer ban rose a big discussion in Telecom Ukraine telegram channel, which is a discussion point for a lot of (but not all) Ukrainian Internet and telecom companies. Instead of explaining things for my requests, Olexandr Fedienko call me there a hidden Russian FSB agent, and Olena Kushnir said I do not understand that "we should keep a valuable resource inside our country during the war". But sorry, these are definitely not their resources! So they should not tell holders what to do with it, until we are not live in a Communist country where all things belongs to the government. This situation makes deeply concern Ukrainian community and resources holders. We are really afraid some of this proposals will be implemented without consensus inside Ukrainian community, just because of government letters, emotional speeches. And definitely without any "closed meetings" (C) Olena Kushnir with NCC staff inaccessible for people with another opinion. It will be so kind if RIPE NCC officials release a statement where they clearly state they will not implement any bans for resource holders not in the distress area. And any changes on the policy will be implemented with the current policy development process, consensus, and in the co-operation with all community. This will calm down the situation and will convince people that NCC really respects and protects the interests of the community members. Thank you very much for the long reading!

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Re: [ncc-services-wg] UA IP transfer
by Claudio Ferronato 30 Oct '22

30 Oct '22

When I read it, it looked plausible. I don't know if it was propaganda, fake news or what else https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/08/09/technology/ukraine-internet-… "They came to them and put guns to their head and just said, 'Do this,'" said Maxim Smelyanets, who owns an internet provider that operates in the area and is based in Kyiv. "They did that step by step for each company." https://www.kentik.com/blog/rerouting-of-kherson-follows-familiar-gameplan/ > Il gio 27 ott 2022, 18:14 Max Tulyev <maxtul(a)netassist.ua> ha scritto: > > Once again, Elena. > > Could you please show any proof of any theft? Even gossips about it? > > NONE. > > 27.10.22 19:10, Олена Кушнір пише: > > Hi all! > > before writing any thoughts here, write your RegID so that it is > clear > > who you represent. are related to the Ukrainian LIR community. > > > > Registry ID: ua.webpro > > > > We are the member of Internet association of Ukraine, We ask > you to > > temporarily freeze IR transfers from the territory of Ukraine. > We are > > sure that this will make IP resources of UA holders not > attractive for > > theft and transfer and therefore will protect its holders. > > > > > > > > > > _______________ > > Best regards, > > Olena Kushnir > > +38(097)748-33-33 > > www.webpro.ua <http://www.webpro.ua> <http://www.webpro.ua> > > > > > > > > -- > > To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or > change your subscription options, please visit: > https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/ncc-services-wg >

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Once again, I'm against the banning of ukrainian internet resources
by Serhii Khomenko 30 Oct '22

30 Oct '22

Good afternoon to all This initiative to ban transfers looks like childish wishful thinking or criminal ambitions. If there are risks of stealing of IP resources from people/companies which for certain reasons remain on the temporarily occupied territories, then it is necessary just to come up with a mechanism to protect these resource holders, and not to ban the entire country. In Ukraine we have a situation of stealing washing machines and toilets by terrorussian occupants. But for some reason you are not asking to ban the sale of used washing machines and toilets throughout Ukraine because moscovites steal them on the temporarily occupied territories. And you do not propose to close the real estate registers of Ukraine, and to control all sales of apartments (houses) through some service company in Kyiv due to the fact that on the temporarily occupied territories, under threat of killing, people can re-register anything to anyone. But you propose to ban people from managing their Internet resources. Very interesting. And in general, who are those persons who carry the danger? Who are those people (actually they aren't people) whom you suspect can steal blocks of addresses from us?... Oh sure, they're ruSSists!!! So, let's suggest throwing them (russia) out of any deals! Ban them from any transfers (buying) and they will steal nothing. It is necessary to punish the criminal, not the potential victim. Let's summarize. Let's look for solutions to protect the resources of companies that are on the temporarily occupied territories, and not to limit our freedom of action and freedom of speech in Ukraine. Governmental monopoly on television has been already established. Single telemarathon. Thank you very much. That's enough. Kind regards, Serhii

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Protecting Resource Holders in Distressed Areas
by Olha Sira 29 Oct '22

29 Oct '22

Hi everyone, I am a PI block IP address holder from Ukraine. My opinion, that freezing all updates is inappropriate and contradicts with RIPE NCC goal to keep RIPE database information reliable. It will bring more harm than benefits to the Ukrainian Internet community. I am surely against the idea of reviewing of requests by national governments due to low credit to some representatives of the government. This significant precedent will obviously open the door to further government intervention and will shut the door for the self-governance model of the Internet in Ukraine. I attentively followed the discussion about Ukrainian IP transfers and I would like to note, that there is a reason why PI block holders don't participate in this discussion despite the decision of transfer restriction will affect them too. First, PI IP block holders are small companies or their activity doesn't relate to the Internet connectivity. Such companies usually don't have budget or interest to attend NCC events. That is why they have a lack of awareness of how the RIPE community is functioning and they simply don't know how to participate. Second, RIPE NCC encouraged PI IP holders to communicate only through their LIRs, so it is fair to consider that LIRs of PI block holders represent their voice here also, in case they don't do it personally. Best regards, Olha Sira

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(No Subject)
by Petryk Pyatochkin 28 Oct '22

28 Oct '22

Dear Matthias, > On 27 Oct 2022, at 18:01, Matthias Merkel <matthias.merkel(a)staclar.com> wrote: > > Dear Viktoriia, > > I don’t think anyone is suggesting to allow transfers and later revert them – there is no real procedure for this and it would likely cause a lot of issues down the line. This is the "option number 1", as it was presented by Athina in yesterday's Working Group session. > What most people seem to be advocating now – and what the RIPE NCC is currently doing – is that additional due diligence should be carried out, which means that special care should be taken that identities are verified and sanctions screening is carried out correctly. The problem with that is requests for transfers made under threat of life will look very legitimate. We have to remove the whole possibility for such a threat. > I understand that IP addresses being stolen could be a problem, however I have not heard of any cases where this has actually happened so far. But here’s an alternative consideration: If a Ukrainian ISP needs additional funding to rebuild and wants to sell IP addresses to enable this, your proposal would potentially cause the exact issues you’re trying to prevent. This sounds pretty unrealistic. If you want to rebuild your network, you would not sell IP addresses, because there is not enough of them and you will need them. But there are people who would will to just sell them for making profit, but not to rebuild anything. Yes, they are also part of this community, and we, as a community, have to decide who we want to support. > Your proposal would essentially freeze assets – similar to what sanctions might do – but of the people who you are trying to support. This can have severe financial consequences for the affected parties, and I really think that this would need to be an opt-in thing (but also that it would need to be defined in a separate and clear policy). This proposal would just keeps things as they are now, will remove potential threats for life, will simplify evaluation of transfers by RIPE NCC, and maybe other things. And yes, it will damage business of Max Tulyuk, but as I said, we could choose who we support. > Matthias Merkel Cheers, Petryk Pyatochkin > From:Viktoriia Opanasiuk <viktoriia.opanasiuk(a)gmail.com> > Date:Thursday, 27. October 2022 at 17:50 > To:Matthias Merkel <matthias.merkel(a)staclar.com> > Cc:ncc-services-wg@ripe.net <ncc-services-wg(a)ripe.net> > Subject:Re: [ncc-services-wg] IP adress transferring in Ukraine > > Dear Mattias, > > responding on «As this only affects LIRs, I doubt there will be significant participation by non-LIRs» I must say that it affects all internet service providers that use IP resources. In Ukraine there are more than 5 000 registered ISPs, but not all of them are LIRs. > > The situation that we have now is that when russian troops withdraw from our territory, they dismantle and take with them not only washing machines, but also telecom equipment, TV- and radio-transmitters, leaving people who live there without any information channels and means of communication. We have tore-buildtelecom and internet infrastructure, and yes, we could bring new equipment there, but if the IP addresses of local Internet Providerswill betransferred to other parties, we will not be able to restore even our critical infrastructure there, and there is no place to get new IPv4 addresses. > > Therefore any solutions that involve allowing transfers now and somehow reverting them later are not solving this immediate problem that we have. > > Viktoriia Opanasiuk > > чт, 27 окт. 2022 г. в 16:59, Matthias Merkel <matthias.merkel(a)staclar.com>: > >> Hi Viktoriia, >> >> RIPE operates on consensus policies. A new policy cannot be adopted if there is a meaningful number of objections like clearly there is here. >> >> As has been explained in the in-person meetings, a freeze cannot be implemented until a corresponding policy is in place, as this may otherwise open up the RIPE NCC to civil liability. Of course, there is also a risk that a freeze could negatively impact Ukrainian LIRs (for example ones who may want to sell parts of their IP space to fund continued operations). >> >> For the reasons above, I personally don’t think that a blanket ban will be a good solution. Instead, the RIPE NCC should conduct increased due diligence on transfers from Ukraine and other high-risk regions. From what I understand, the NCC has already implemented these measures. >> >> Most of the recent emails have already identified themselves as Ukrainian, some including a reg-id or at least mentioning they were an LIR as well. As this only affects LIRs, I doubt there will be significant participation by non-LIRs. >> >> Matthias Merkel >> >> Staclar, Inc. >> >> From:ncc-services-wg <ncc-services-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of Viktoriia Opanasiuk <viktoriia.opanasiuk(a)gmail.com> >> Date:Thursday, 27. October 2022 at 15:51 >> To:ncc-services-wg@ripe.net<ncc-services-wg(a)ripe.net> >> Subject:[ncc-services-wg] IP adress transferring in Ukraine >> >> Hi everyone! >> >> Looking at such a broad discussion around the issue of the decision to protect Ukrainian IP resources, I want to add a comment and a wish. >> >> First of all, I would like to clarify the issue a little. We are only talking about temporarily freezing the transfer of IP addresses until a solution to correctly identify and prohibit risky transfers is found and implemented. >> >> And in order to understand who exactly is against the temporary freeze or who supports it , it would be very good if you wrote a few words about who exactly those who express their position represent. >> For example, does the company have LIR status, is the company an ISP provider, and if so, in which regions of Ukraine does it provide services. If the LIR is not a ISP provider, does it continue its work in Ukraine? This is purely to understand whether the position of the participant in the discussion is from a representative of the Ukrainian community and what part of this community he represents. >> >> Otherwise, this discussion may slightly distort the real problems that exist in Ukraine today. >> >> -- >> >> Viktoriia Opanasiuk > > -- > > З повагою, > > Вікторія Опанасюк > > -- > > To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or change your subscription options, please visit: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/ncc-services-wg

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Transfers from Ukraine, how to ideed protect resource holders
by Vitaly Zubok 28 Oct '22

28 Oct '22

On behalf of UA.VISTI (LIR est. 1997, Kyiv, Ukraine) I have to tell that we can't support neither banning of IP transfers from Ukrasinian LIRs nor including any UA Government institution into process of transfer approval. In our opinion them cannot serve the aim declared by authors of such initiatives. Instead, taking onto account the Russian aggression and that there are Ukrainian territories _temporarily_ occupied by enemy forces which widely use terror and robbery, RIPE NCC should consider additional due diligence procedures approving transfers from Ukrainian LIRs. These procedures should be discussed, but they should remain possible in our realities. The disclaimer about possibility of transfer reversion offered in [Protecting Resource Holders in Distressed Areas] seems reasonable, however bona fide buyers might avoid additional risk of such situation and choose not to deal with UA IP address blocks. What would be offered instead: transfer request might be precessed by several-step verification, and one of the steps, for example, might include geolocation verification of the person submitting the request (presuming that there are definitely non-occupied and non-combat areas where Ukrainian governance carried out in full, so such person is not unburdened by the circumstances of the war). Regards, Vitaly Zubok Deputy Director ELVSITI Information Center Kyiv, Ukraine +380442399091 http://visti.net

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