- ncc-services-wg - mailman.ripe.net

Once again, I'm against the banning of ukrainian internet resources
by Serhii Khomenko 30 Oct '22

30 Oct '22

Good afternoon to all This initiative to ban transfers looks like childish wishful thinking or criminal ambitions. If there are risks of stealing of IP resources from people/companies which for certain reasons remain on the temporarily occupied territories, then it is necessary just to come up with a mechanism to protect these resource holders, and not to ban the entire country. In Ukraine we have a situation of stealing washing machines and toilets by terrorussian occupants. But for some reason you are not asking to ban the sale of used washing machines and toilets throughout Ukraine because moscovites steal them on the temporarily occupied territories. And you do not propose to close the real estate registers of Ukraine, and to control all sales of apartments (houses) through some service company in Kyiv due to the fact that on the temporarily occupied territories, under threat of killing, people can re-register anything to anyone. But you propose to ban people from managing their Internet resources. Very interesting. And in general, who are those persons who carry the danger? Who are those people (actually they aren't people) whom you suspect can steal blocks of addresses from us?... Oh sure, they're ruSSists!!! So, let's suggest throwing them (russia) out of any deals! Ban them from any transfers (buying) and they will steal nothing. It is necessary to punish the criminal, not the potential victim. Let's summarize. Let's look for solutions to protect the resources of companies that are on the temporarily occupied territories, and not to limit our freedom of action and freedom of speech in Ukraine. Governmental monopoly on television has been already established. Single telemarathon. Thank you very much. That's enough. Kind regards, Serhii

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Protecting Resource Holders in Distressed Areas
by Olha Sira 29 Oct '22

29 Oct '22

Hi everyone, I am a PI block IP address holder from Ukraine. My opinion, that freezing all updates is inappropriate and contradicts with RIPE NCC goal to keep RIPE database information reliable. It will bring more harm than benefits to the Ukrainian Internet community. I am surely against the idea of reviewing of requests by national governments due to low credit to some representatives of the government. This significant precedent will obviously open the door to further government intervention and will shut the door for the self-governance model of the Internet in Ukraine. I attentively followed the discussion about Ukrainian IP transfers and I would like to note, that there is a reason why PI block holders don't participate in this discussion despite the decision of transfer restriction will affect them too. First, PI IP block holders are small companies or their activity doesn't relate to the Internet connectivity. Such companies usually don't have budget or interest to attend NCC events. That is why they have a lack of awareness of how the RIPE community is functioning and they simply don't know how to participate. Second, RIPE NCC encouraged PI IP holders to communicate only through their LIRs, so it is fair to consider that LIRs of PI block holders represent their voice here also, in case they don't do it personally. Best regards, Olha Sira

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(No Subject)
by Petryk Pyatochkin 28 Oct '22

28 Oct '22

Dear Matthias, > On 27 Oct 2022, at 18:01, Matthias Merkel <matthias.merkel(a)staclar.com> wrote: > > Dear Viktoriia, > > I don’t think anyone is suggesting to allow transfers and later revert them – there is no real procedure for this and it would likely cause a lot of issues down the line. This is the "option number 1", as it was presented by Athina in yesterday's Working Group session. > What most people seem to be advocating now – and what the RIPE NCC is currently doing – is that additional due diligence should be carried out, which means that special care should be taken that identities are verified and sanctions screening is carried out correctly. The problem with that is requests for transfers made under threat of life will look very legitimate. We have to remove the whole possibility for such a threat. > I understand that IP addresses being stolen could be a problem, however I have not heard of any cases where this has actually happened so far. But here’s an alternative consideration: If a Ukrainian ISP needs additional funding to rebuild and wants to sell IP addresses to enable this, your proposal would potentially cause the exact issues you’re trying to prevent. This sounds pretty unrealistic. If you want to rebuild your network, you would not sell IP addresses, because there is not enough of them and you will need them. But there are people who would will to just sell them for making profit, but not to rebuild anything. Yes, they are also part of this community, and we, as a community, have to decide who we want to support. > Your proposal would essentially freeze assets – similar to what sanctions might do – but of the people who you are trying to support. This can have severe financial consequences for the affected parties, and I really think that this would need to be an opt-in thing (but also that it would need to be defined in a separate and clear policy). This proposal would just keeps things as they are now, will remove potential threats for life, will simplify evaluation of transfers by RIPE NCC, and maybe other things. And yes, it will damage business of Max Tulyuk, but as I said, we could choose who we support. > Matthias Merkel Cheers, Petryk Pyatochkin > From:Viktoriia Opanasiuk <viktoriia.opanasiuk(a)gmail.com> > Date:Thursday, 27. October 2022 at 17:50 > To:Matthias Merkel <matthias.merkel(a)staclar.com> > Cc:ncc-services-wg@ripe.net <ncc-services-wg(a)ripe.net> > Subject:Re: [ncc-services-wg] IP adress transferring in Ukraine > > Dear Mattias, > > responding on «As this only affects LIRs, I doubt there will be significant participation by non-LIRs» I must say that it affects all internet service providers that use IP resources. In Ukraine there are more than 5 000 registered ISPs, but not all of them are LIRs. > > The situation that we have now is that when russian troops withdraw from our territory, they dismantle and take with them not only washing machines, but also telecom equipment, TV- and radio-transmitters, leaving people who live there without any information channels and means of communication. We have tore-buildtelecom and internet infrastructure, and yes, we could bring new equipment there, but if the IP addresses of local Internet Providerswill betransferred to other parties, we will not be able to restore even our critical infrastructure there, and there is no place to get new IPv4 addresses. > > Therefore any solutions that involve allowing transfers now and somehow reverting them later are not solving this immediate problem that we have. > > Viktoriia Opanasiuk > > чт, 27 окт. 2022 г. в 16:59, Matthias Merkel <matthias.merkel(a)staclar.com>: > >> Hi Viktoriia, >> >> RIPE operates on consensus policies. A new policy cannot be adopted if there is a meaningful number of objections like clearly there is here. >> >> As has been explained in the in-person meetings, a freeze cannot be implemented until a corresponding policy is in place, as this may otherwise open up the RIPE NCC to civil liability. Of course, there is also a risk that a freeze could negatively impact Ukrainian LIRs (for example ones who may want to sell parts of their IP space to fund continued operations). >> >> For the reasons above, I personally don’t think that a blanket ban will be a good solution. Instead, the RIPE NCC should conduct increased due diligence on transfers from Ukraine and other high-risk regions. From what I understand, the NCC has already implemented these measures. >> >> Most of the recent emails have already identified themselves as Ukrainian, some including a reg-id or at least mentioning they were an LIR as well. As this only affects LIRs, I doubt there will be significant participation by non-LIRs. >> >> Matthias Merkel >> >> Staclar, Inc. >> >> From:ncc-services-wg <ncc-services-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of Viktoriia Opanasiuk <viktoriia.opanasiuk(a)gmail.com> >> Date:Thursday, 27. October 2022 at 15:51 >> To:ncc-services-wg@ripe.net<ncc-services-wg(a)ripe.net> >> Subject:[ncc-services-wg] IP adress transferring in Ukraine >> >> Hi everyone! >> >> Looking at such a broad discussion around the issue of the decision to protect Ukrainian IP resources, I want to add a comment and a wish. >> >> First of all, I would like to clarify the issue a little. We are only talking about temporarily freezing the transfer of IP addresses until a solution to correctly identify and prohibit risky transfers is found and implemented. >> >> And in order to understand who exactly is against the temporary freeze or who supports it , it would be very good if you wrote a few words about who exactly those who express their position represent. >> For example, does the company have LIR status, is the company an ISP provider, and if so, in which regions of Ukraine does it provide services. If the LIR is not a ISP provider, does it continue its work in Ukraine? This is purely to understand whether the position of the participant in the discussion is from a representative of the Ukrainian community and what part of this community he represents. >> >> Otherwise, this discussion may slightly distort the real problems that exist in Ukraine today. >> >> -- >> >> Viktoriia Opanasiuk > > -- > > З повагою, > > Вікторія Опанасюк > > -- > > To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or change your subscription options, please visit: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/ncc-services-wg

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Transfers from Ukraine, how to ideed protect resource holders
by Vitaly Zubok 28 Oct '22

28 Oct '22

On behalf of UA.VISTI (LIR est. 1997, Kyiv, Ukraine) I have to tell that we can't support neither banning of IP transfers from Ukrasinian LIRs nor including any UA Government institution into process of transfer approval. In our opinion them cannot serve the aim declared by authors of such initiatives. Instead, taking onto account the Russian aggression and that there are Ukrainian territories _temporarily_ occupied by enemy forces which widely use terror and robbery, RIPE NCC should consider additional due diligence procedures approving transfers from Ukrainian LIRs. These procedures should be discussed, but they should remain possible in our realities. The disclaimer about possibility of transfer reversion offered in [Protecting Resource Holders in Distressed Areas] seems reasonable, however bona fide buyers might avoid additional risk of such situation and choose not to deal with UA IP address blocks. What would be offered instead: transfer request might be precessed by several-step verification, and one of the steps, for example, might include geolocation verification of the person submitting the request (presuming that there are definitely non-occupied and non-combat areas where Ukrainian governance carried out in full, so such person is not unburdened by the circumstances of the war). Regards, Vitaly Zubok Deputy Director ELVSITI Information Center Kyiv, Ukraine +380442399091 http://visti.net

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Protecting Resource Holders in Distressed Areas
by Athina Fragkouli 28 Oct '22

28 Oct '22

Dear colleagues, We have recently seen people raising concerns about the risk of illegitimate registry update requests in Ukraine being submitted to the RIPE NCC. We have published an article on RIPE Labs that explains what we have been doing to minimise this risk so far and looks at some additional measures we could implement: https://labs.ripe.net/author/athina/protecting-resource-holders-in-distress… <https://labs.ripe.net/author/athina/protecting-resource-holders-in-distress…> We will also be presenting on this topic in the RIPE NCC Services Working Group at RIPE 85. We are interested in hearing any feedback or suggestions from the RIPE community on this issue. Regards, Athina Fragkouli Chief Legal Officer RIPE NCC

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Re: [ncc-services-wg] IP adress transferring in Ukraine
by Petryk Pyatochkin 28 Oct '22

28 Oct '22

Sergey, > On 27 Oct 2022, at 18:13, Sergey Myasoedov via ncc-services-wg <ncc-services-wg(a)ripe.net> wrote: > > Viktoriia, > >> We have to re-build telecom and internet infrastructure, and yes, we could bring new equipment there, but if the IP addresses of local Internet Providers will be transferred to other parties, we will not be able to restore even our critical infrastructure there, and there is no place to get new IPv4 addresses. > > You don't need IPv4 addresses for rebuilding IT infrastructure. There are lot of equipment supplied with Keep Ukraine Connected project, the equipment list is public and I'm pretty sure all of this equipment support IPv6. If that would be possible, we would not have this discussion at all, and the transfer of resources would not exist as such. Everybody would just get a fresh block of IPv6 addresses and we would forget about IPv4. And I'm pretty sure you know that, so let's not diverge the discussion. Cheers, Petryk Pyatochkin > -- > Kind regards, > Sergey Myasoedov > >> On 27. 10. 2022, at 17:44, Viktoriia Opanasiuk <viktoriia.opanasiuk(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Dear Mattias, >> >> responding on «As this only affects LIRs, I doubt there will be significant participation by non-LIRs» I must say that it affects all internet service providers that use IP resources. In Ukraine there are more than 5 000 registered ISPs, but not all of them are LIRs. >> >> The situation that we have now is that when russian troops withdraw from our territory, they dismantle and take with them not only washing machines, but also telecom equipment, TV- and radio-transmitters, leaving people who live there without any information channels and means of communication. We have to re-build telecom and internet infrastructure, and yes, we could bring new equipment there, but if the IP addresses of local Internet Providers will be transferred to other parties, we will not be able to restore even our critical infrastructure there, and there is no place to get new IPv4 addresses. >> >> Therefore any solutions that involve allowing transfers now and somehow reverting them later are not solving this immediate problem that we have. >> >> Viktoriia Opanasiuk >> >> чт, 27 окт. 2022 г. в 16:59, Matthias Merkel <matthias.merkel(a)staclar.com>: >> Hi Viktoriia, >> >> RIPE operates on consensus policies. A new policy cannot be adopted if there is a meaningful number of objections like clearly there is here. >> >> As has been explained in the in-person meetings, a freeze cannot be implemented until a corresponding policy is in place, as this may otherwise open up the RIPE NCC to civil liability. Of course, there is also a risk that a freeze could negatively impact Ukrainian LIRs (for example ones who may want to sell parts of their IP space to fund continued operations). >> >> For the reasons above, I personally don’t think that a blanket ban will be a good solution. Instead, the RIPE NCC should conduct increased due diligence on transfers from Ukraine and other high-risk regions. From what I understand, the NCC has already implemented these measures. >> >> Most of the recent emails have already identified themselves as Ukrainian, some including a reg-id or at least mentioning they were an LIR as well. As this only affects LIRs, I doubt there will be significant participation by non-LIRs. >> >> Matthias Merkel >> >> Staclar, Inc. >> >> From: ncc-services-wg <ncc-services-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of Viktoriia Opanasiuk <viktoriia.opanasiuk(a)gmail.com> >> Date: Thursday, 27. October 2022 at 15:51 >> To: ncc-services-wg(a)ripe.net <ncc-services-wg(a)ripe.net> >> Subject: [ncc-services-wg] IP adress transferring in Ukraine >> >> Hi everyone! >> >> Looking at such a broad discussion around the issue of the decision to protect Ukrainian IP resources, I want to add a comment and a wish. >> >> First of all, I would like to clarify the issue a little. We are only talking about temporarily freezing the transfer of IP addresses until a solution to correctly identify and prohibit risky transfers is found and implemented. >> >> And in order to understand who exactly is against the temporary freeze or who supports it , it would be very good if you wrote a few words about who exactly those who express their position represent. >> For example, does the company have LIR status, is the company an ISP provider, and if so, in which regions of Ukraine does it provide services. If the LIR is not a ISP provider, does it continue its work in Ukraine? This is purely to understand whether the position of the participant in the discussion is from a representative of the Ukrainian community and what part of this community he represents. >> >> Otherwise, this discussion may slightly distort the real problems that exist in Ukraine today. >> >> -- >> >> Viktoriia Opanasiuk >> >> -- >> З повагою, >> Вікторія Опанасюк >> -- >> >> To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or change your subscription options, please visit: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/ncc-services-wg > > -- > > To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or change your subscription options, please visit: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/ncc-services-wg

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UA IP transfer
by Олена Кушнір 27 Oct '22

27 Oct '22

Hi all! before writing any thoughts here, write your RegID so that it is clear who you represent. are related to the Ukrainian LIR community. Registry ID: ua.webpro We are the member of Internet association of Ukraine, We ask you to temporarily freeze IR transfers from the territory of Ukraine. We are sure that this will make IP resources of UA holders not attractive for theft and transfer and therefore will protect its holders. _______________ Best regards, Olena Kushnir +38(097)748-33-33 www.webpro.ua

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IP adress transferring in Ukraine
by Viktoriia Opanasiuk 27 Oct '22

27 Oct '22

Hi everyone! Looking at such a broad discussion around the issue of the decision to protect Ukrainian IP resources, I want to add a comment and a wish. First of all, I would like to clarify the issue a little. We are only talking about temporarily freezing the transfer of IP addresses until a solution to correctly identify and prohibit risky transfers is found and implemented. And in order to understand who exactly is against the temporary freeze or who supports it , it would be very good if you wrote a few words about who exactly those who express their position represent. For example, does the company have LIR status, is the company an ISP provider, and if so, in which regions of Ukraine does it provide services. If the LIR is not a ISP provider, does it continue its work in Ukraine? This is purely to understand whether the position of the participant in the discussion is from a representative of the Ukrainian community and what part of this community he represents. Otherwise, this discussion may slightly distort the real problems that exist in Ukraine today. -- Viktoriia Opanasiuk

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Transfer of IP addresses
by ТзОВ "Інтелект Груп" 27 Oct '22

27 Oct '22

Hi community! I represent Intelekt Group company from Ukraine. Registry ID 224. I support the solution of temporary frozen any IP transferring from Ukraine, including the occupied territories. Best regards, Oleksii Tykhenkiy

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transfer UA
by marina＠lir-ukraine.com 27 Oct '22

27 Oct '22

Hi,I am against blocking the transfer for Ukraine. Improved checkout system - Exit ♥

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