Protecting Resource Holders in Distressed Areas
Dear colleagues, We have recently seen people raising concerns about the risk of illegitimate registry update requests in Ukraine being submitted to the RIPE NCC. We have published an article on RIPE Labs that explains what we have been doing to minimise this risk so far and looks at some additional measures we could implement: https://labs.ripe.net/author/athina/protecting-resource-holders-in-distresse... <https://labs.ripe.net/author/athina/protecting-resource-holders-in-distressed-areas/> We will also be presenting on this topic in the RIPE NCC Services Working Group at RIPE 85. We are interested in hearing any feedback or suggestions from the RIPE community on this issue. Regards, Athina Fragkouli Chief Legal Officer RIPE NCC
Hi All, while protecting resources and it's holders is very important in distress areas, I have to remind you that Ukraine is a way not a democratic country. If we want really protect resources and holders, we have to avoid any interaction with Ukrainian government in any way. In the practice, "Review of requests by national governments" means you will have to pay a huge bribe to get a letter of authorization from the government. They all understand good the price of transfers... Sorry, it is sad, but true. Any other options are good. The best for me is a "freeze button". Also it is good to allow transfers only from the territories not in distress, so company/person should move the legal address to the clear area. It is quite easy, and is similar than what is doing now. But any push from RIPE NCC to move to the "distress area", i.e. re-registration on the occupied territory by the "laws" existing there is unacceptable. 14.10.22 17:47, Athina Fragkouli пише:
Dear colleagues,
We have recently seen people raising concerns about the risk of illegitimate registry update requests in Ukraine being submitted to the RIPE NCC. We have published an article on RIPE Labs that explains what we have been doing to minimise this risk so far and looks at some additional measures we could implement: https://labs.ripe.net/author/athina/protecting-resource-holders-in-distresse... <https://labs.ripe.net/author/athina/protecting-resource-holders-in-distressed-areas/>
We will also be presenting on this topic in the RIPE NCC Services Working Group at RIPE 85. We are interested in hearing any feedback or suggestions from the RIPE community on this issue.
Regards,
Athina Fragkouli Chief Legal Officer RIPE NCC
I believe the RIPE NCC already makes extra steps when a request does not appear to be legitimate, therefore I don't think there is much else that can be done although cryptography could be used to reduce the risks of impersonation. However, I am vigorously against asking national governments for their participation, with special mention for the Ukrainian government. In general, governments are not fond of systems that allow people to communicate in p2p without interferences, however the Ukrainian government is a particularly ferocious enemy of the Internet and it is important the RIPE NCC does not allow them any interference in how resource allocation is organized. Also, appeal to emotion is being used by some people trying to pretend to be some sorts of heroes or white knights of Ukraine by insinuating that the hijacking could only necessarily be perpetuated by Russian invaders as if there were not hoarders in Ukraine just as capable of doing this without any support from Russia. There is anyway a strong incentive for this to happen in both countries as IPv6 is practically inexistent but the remains of a bygone era when the development of the Internet was thriving in both countries resulted in a lot of resources being allocated there. Also, I back Max Tulyev's comment, it is important to repeat that Ukraine is a country where there is no freedom of speech, no free press, no political opposition, not even fake opposition, and no democracy. In fact, any critic of the government will result in yourself being labeled an enemy of Ukraine, a collaborator, a terrorist or as a person justifying the invasion. This can result in your arbitrary arrest or worse. The government also uses terror such as the Martial Law to deter people from having the slightest ambition to criticize them. Other violations of human rights and the constitution perpetrated by the government of Ukraine include attacking ISPs that provide free and neutral Internet, persecuting their owners and employees, threatening to label them as collaborators and trying to shut them shutdown. Ukraine has an agency called NKRZI, a clone of Russia's roskomnadzor, dedicated to this activity. Public threats to ISPs can be found at their web site. As such, the credibility and legitimacy of requests coming from persons and entities from Ukraine using emotional speech with rambling about democracy and freedom and claiming to be representative of the whole community should be questioned and challenged. In fact, I consider it a waste to allocate public resources to those who lack basic understanding for the ethics involved in operating an ISP. And if I were an extremist and dicatator, I would revoke resources that have been allocated to them and I think we would recover a lot of space.
participants (3)
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Athina Fragkouli
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Max Tulyev
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Paul BD