I too am inclined towards a variant of option 3. - option 1 to me is simply too much heavyweight structure for a single- person role. - option 2 I feel is exclusionary to otherwise well-matched candidates, and places the role at risk of capture by employer vested interests. On 02/20/18 06:25, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
Before leaping to conclusions, it might be worth kicking around ideas for how the risks identified in Option 3 might be mitigated.
Indeed, there ought to be models that would uphold the RIPE Chair's autonomy and policy/editorial independence while still being funded by the RIPE NCC. This might involve funding via long-term grant/endowment commitments rather than annual budget revenue stream-derived salary, fixed-term appointment, and/or other arms-length approaches along Malcolm's suggestions. It's very possible other organisations (not necessarily in our sector) have already figured out models for such arrangements, and it may be a good idea to research these for appropriate approaches. Keith
I agree think the risk of loss of independence is a valid concern we should be wary about. I wouldn't agree with someone who was casually dismissive of this as an issue. But Option 3 doesn't *have* to be "the RIPE Chair is employed at will by, and under the direct instructions of, the NCC". With care and thought, I am confident we can do better than that.
The terms of this contract could in principle be designed to protect his independence from the NCC, and accountability to the RIPE community. The Chair will himself have an interest defending those terms.
For example, perhaps the contract could provide that it may not be terminated by the NCC unless and until some RIPE community process has removed the person as Chair [*]. That might still require us to be a bit more clear what the process in the RIPE community for removal of the Chair should be, but it moves the locus of work to be done back into the community.