In message <2359D829-0A68-40C2-ABF4-78199D8B49E0@steffann.nl>, Sander Steffann <sander@steffann.nl> wrote:
1) How was it possible for various IPv4 block WHOIS records to be stored in the RIPE WHOIS DB, even though it is quite apparently the case that, according to IANA WHOIS records, the IP blocks in question do not even belong to the RIPE region? Is there really no pre-checking performed on such records before they are stored in the RIPE data base, e.g. to see if the blocks in question belong either to RIPE or to some other RiR?
First one clarification: we're talking about route objects here, not inetnum or aut-num objects. Route objects document which ASN is supposed to announce which address space. There are valid use cases for an ASN from one region to announce address space from another region. In other words: the inetnum object from one region's database is linked to the aut-num object in another region's database. Making referential integrity and authorisation work in such cases is very hard. The current implementation is quite permissive to make it possible to document real-life situations. Unfortunately it also makes it possible to reference some resources in other regions that don't belong to you.
Thank you. The above response is both clear and enlightening... for me anyway. And it makes perfect sense. I will certainly be paying a lot more attention to those WHOIS field names in the future!
2) How was it possible for a particular Bulgarian commercial organization to be granted its own AS number, when all available evidence seems to indicate that it actually had, and has, -zero- IP addresses which are actually and properly registered to it? Is there really no pre-checking performed on AS number allocations, e.g. to see if the organization requesting the AS has at least some IP addresses?
Having IP addresses is not a requirement for getting an ASN. There are many legitimate cases where an ASN may be used to announce address space belonging to someone else. For example an ISP announcing address space belonging to its customer. Or a transit provider.
OK, that's a good point. But I'm not sure that it fully negates the possible value of my question. Everybody is _supposed_ to have working e-mail address contacts in their IP allocation records within the WHOIS data bases of the various RiRs, yes? So suppose that there had been a protocol in place that required an affirmative e-mail response from at least one legitimate IP address block registrant (in some/any region) before the allocation of an AS number would proceed. Such a protocol would have forestalled the situation that we now see with AS201640, would it not? Regards, rfg